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INTRODUCTION
Internal Revenue Code ("Code") § 501(c)(4) provides for exemp-
tion from federal income tax for:
Civic leagues or organizations not organized for profit but operated
exclusively for the promotion of social welfare, or local associa-
tions of employees, the membership of which is limited to the em-
ployees of a designated person or persons in a particular
municipality, and the net earnings of which are devoted exclusively
to charitable, educational, or recreational purposes. t
Other than the addition in 1996 of a prohibition on private inure-
ment (i.e., on the distribution of net earnings to a private shareholder
or individual), this language has remained almost unchanged for close
to 100 years.2 In fact, Congress included the exemption for "any civic
league or organization not organized for profit, but operated exclu-
sively for the promotion of social welfare" in the first 1913 version of
what is now the Code.3 Congress added the language relating to local
associations of employees in 1924, and that language has remained
unchanged ever since.4
The vagueness of the first phrase, and the failure of the Treasury
Department and Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") to interpret it in a
manner that would significantly limit that Vagueness, has led some
commentators to criticize the "catchall" nature of this exemption cate-
gory. 5 Other authors in this issue are addressing the application of
1. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)(A) (2012).
2. See Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, § 1311(b)(1), 110 Stat.
1452, 1477-78 (1996) (codified at I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)(B)). In 2015 Congress enacted
changes to other sections of the Internal Revenue Code that affected § 501(c)(4) orga-
nizations, including with respect to the applicability of the gift tax, a notice require-
ment, and a declaratory judgment process. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016,
Pub. L. No. 114-113, Div. Q, §§ 405(a), 406(a), 408(a), 129 Stat. 3040, 3118-21
(codified at I.R.C. §§ 506, 2501(a)(6), 7428(a)(l)(E)).
3. Tariff Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § II(G)(a), 38 Stat. 114, 172.
4. See Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 231(8), 43 Stat. 253, 282.
5. See, e.g., James A. Amdur, Tax Exemption of Social Welfare Organizations, 45
TAxEs 292, 292, 300 (1967); Frances R. Hill, Citizens United and Social Welfare
Organizations: The Tangled Relationships Among Guidance, Compliance, and En-
forcement, 43 STETSON L. REv. 539, 544-47 (2014); see also JAMES L. FISHMAN &
STEPHEN SCHWARZ, CASES AND MATERIALS: NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 581 (2d ed.
2000) ("§ 501(c)(4) has become the 'dumping ground' for organizations that fail to
make the grade as a § 501(c)(3) charity but nonetheless provide a substantial public
benefit"); JEREMY KOULISH, URBAN INST., FROM CAMPS TO CAMPAIGN FuNDs: THE
HISTORY, ANATOMY, AND ACTIVITIES OF 501(c)(4) ORGANIZATIONS 4 (2016) http://
www.urban.org/research/publication/camps-campaign-funds-history-anatomy-and-ac
tivities-501c4-organizations ("Section 501(c)(4) serves as a sort of dumping ground
for organizations otherwise difficult to categorize, assuming the organizations have a
significant social welfare mission."). But see Benjamin Moses Leff, Tax Planning for
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§ 501(c)(4) to organizations engaged in political campaign activity
and lobbying, as well as to some of the most common types of
§ 501(c)(4) organizations, such as community service clubs and pre-
paid medical plans, so I do not focus on this criticism as it applies in
those contexts. Instead, I focus on the many other types of organiza-
tions that have found a home in § 501(c)(4).
More specifically, after briefly reviewing the very limited legisla-
tive history of this provision, I survey these other types of organiza-
tions and, as best as can be determined, examine why they have
claimed this status and how they have managed to do so successfully.
I then critique these myriad uses of § 501(c)(4). Based on this review,
I conclude that not only is the "catchall" nature of § 501(c)(4) not
inconsistent with its language and limited legislative history, but that
nature is generally defensible as the appropriate tax classification for
these various entities. The only exceptions are the relatively rare in-
stances where Congress intended to create an exclusive exemption cat-
egory for a particular type of organization with specific restrictions. In
those situations, allowing that type of organization to instead qualify
for exemption under § 501(c)(4) would permit it to avoid the restric-
tions Congress intended to place on that type as a condition for ex-
emption. This appears to be the case with respect to two categories of
entities: charitable organizations that federal tax law would classify as
private foundations if they were exempt under Code § 501(c)(3); and
electric and water cooperatives that Congress intended to receive ex-
emption exclusively under § 501(c)(12).
First, however, I should note that this analysis is hindered by cer-
tain data limitations. While the IRS includes § 501(c)(4) organizations
in its various statistical publications, 6 and the Urban Institute recently
issued a study parsing the § 501(c)(4) universe, 7 more fine-grained
data are difficult to acquire. I have therefore relied on a variety of
GuideStar searches to attempt to get a sense of the approximate num-
ber of the types of organizations I will discuss, as well as to locate the
Marijuana Dealers, 99 IOWA L. REV. 523, 558 (2014) (defending the catchall nature
of § 501(c)(4), at least to the extent § 501(c)(4) organizations are permitted to engage
in a greater quantity of non-exempt activities than organizations described in I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3)).
6. See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2017 DATA BOOK 55-57 (2018); SO1 Tax
Stats - Charities & Other Tax-Exempt Organizations Statistics, INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-charities-and-other-tax-exempt-or
ganizations-statistics (last visited Feb. 8, 2019).
7. KOULISH, supra note 5.
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IRS Form 990 annual returns for illustrative entities. 8 Nonetheless, it
must be acknowledged that GuideStar is also limited in a variety of
ways. There are possible accuracy issues with the IRS Forms 990,
both as originally filed and as interpreted or recorded by GuideStar for
searching purposes, as well as accuracy and coverage issues with the
National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities ("NTEE") coding system that
is used in some searches. 9 In recognition of these limitations, my ob-
servations regarding the numbers and finances of the various types of
nonprofits that claim exemption under § 501(c)(4) are only rough
approximations.
I.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Both the legislative history for what is now Code § 501(c)(4) and
the analysis of that history have been sparse. The current statutory
language can be traced to a Senate amendment of the Tariff Act of
October 3, 1913 ("Tariff Act of 1913").l0 The IRS in an internal train-
ing document states that "[i]t is generally assumed .. that its enact-
ment was the result of a U.S. Chamber of Commerce request for an
exemption for 'civic and commercial' organizations," an observation
that appears to have first been made in print by James J. McGovern in
1976 when he was with the IRS Exempt Organizations Technical
Branch.'1 Careful review of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce's origi-
nal request indicates that the current broad interpretation of
§ 501 (c)(4) is not inconsistent with its original meaning for the fol-
lowing reasons.12
8. See GuideStar History, GUIDESTAR, https://learn.guidestar.org/about-us/history
(last visited Feb. 8, 2019). GuideStar is a nonprofit organization that has created a
comprehensive, accessible, and searchable database of tax-exempt nonprofit organiza-
tions, primarily by obtaining publicly available information for such organizations.
9. See generally National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities, NAT'L CTR. FOR CHARI-
TABL: STAT., http://nccs.urban.org/classification/national-taxonomy-exempt-entities
(last visited Feb. 6, 2019).
10. See S. REP. No. 63-80 at 3 (1913), reprinted in 1939-1 (part 2) C.B. 1, 4, 1913
WL 20195.
I 1. See James J. McGovern, The Exemption Provisions of Subchapter F, 29 TAX
LAW. 523, 530 (1976); John Francis Reilly, Carter C. Hull & Barbara A. Braig Allen,
IRC 501(c)(4) Organizations, in EXEMPT ORGANIATIONS: CONTINUING PROF-S-
SIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003, at
I-1, 1-2 (2002), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopici03.pdf.
12. See STAFF O1F S. COMM. ON FIN., 63D CONG., TARIFF SCHEDULES: BRIEFS AND
STATEMENTS FILED WITH THE COMM. ON FIN. UNITED STATES SENATE SIXTY-THIRD
CONGRESS FIRST SESSION ON H.R. 3321 AN ACT TO REDUCE TARIF DUTIES AND TO
PROVIDE REVENUE FOR THE GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, 2001 (Comm.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Legislation and Public Policy
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First, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce ("Chamber") noted that in
the 1909 version of the federal corporate income tax, the imposition of
that tax was modified by a "for profit" requirement. 13 While the
Chamber did not mention it, the 1894 version of the federal income
tax included similar language. 14 It therefore appears that all nonprofit
entities were exempt from these earlier versions of the federal income
tax imposed on non-natural persons, although these earlier laws also
included a specific exemption for entities furthering charitable, relig-
ious, or educational purposes. At least for the 1909 version, this spe-
cific exemption appears to have been motivated by a concern of some
members of Congress that the "for profit" language was insufficient to
exempt nonprofit organizations that generated a profit in a financial
sense, even though that profit was dedicated to the organization's pur-
poses and not available to any owners. 15 The Tariff Act of 1913 did
not include a "for profit" requirement, however, which the Chamber
cited as the reason for its request. 16
Second, the Chamber only asked that an exemption be added for
"commercial organizations not organized for profit" (which presuma-
bly would include the Chamber and similar organizations), although a
second commentator that otherwise repeated the Chamber's comments
proposed an exemption for "civic or commercial organizations not or-
ganized for profit" (emphasis added). 17 The language Congress ulti-
Print 1913) [hereinafter BRIEFS AND STATEMENTS] (statement of Elliot H. Goodwin,
General Secretary, Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America).
13. See Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112 ("[E]very corporation,
joint stock company or association, organized for profit and having a capital stock
represented by shares .. shall be subject to pay annually a special excise tax with
respect to the carrying on or doing business by such corporation .... " (emphasis
added)). The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of this tax in Flint v.
Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911).
14. Revenue Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509, 556 ("[T]here shall be as-
sessed, levied, and collected ... a tax . . . on ... all other corporations, companies, or
associations doing business for profit .... (emphasis added)). The Supreme Court
declared this version of the income tax unconstitutional in 1895, which led to the
adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913. See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust
Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
15. See 44 CONG. REC. 4151 (daily ed. July 6, 1909) (statement of Sen. Bacon);
Harvey P. Dale, The Crux of Charity: Inurement, Private Benefit, and Excess Benefit
Transactions 2-5 (Oct. 28, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), https://ncpl.law.nyu.edu/
wp-content/uploads/pdfs/2004/Conf2004_DaleDRAFT.pdf (describing relevant leg-
islative history); supra notes 13-14.
16. See BRIEFS AND STATEMENTS, supra note 12 (statement of Elliot H. Goodwin,
General Secretary, Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America).
17. See BRIEFS AND STATEMENTS, supra note 12, at 2002 (statement of Elliot H.
Goodwin, General Secretary, Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America); id. at 2040 (statement of Charles L. Criss, Secretary, American Warehouse-
men's Association (Inc.)).
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mately adopted was broader than both requests, however, providing an
exemption for "any civic league or organization not organized for
profit, but operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare,"
as well as for "business leagues," "chambers of commerce," and
"boards of trade."' 18 This was the case even though some members of
Congress took the position that the use of the term "net income" in the
relevant provision of the Tariff Act of 1913 necessarily exempted all
organizations not doing business for or acquiring profit. 19
Further historical research indicates that this language was even
broader than it may appear to a modern reader. In the late 1800s and
early 1900s, the term "civic league" was commonly associated with
politically active organizations that generally pursued what would be
characterized today as "good government" and progressive causes, in-
cluding prison reform and women's suffrage, which do not appear to
have been the focus or even within the scope of the Chamber's re-
quest.20 The political activity of such civic leagues included in at least
some instances evaluating candidates for election to public office.
21
The creation by Congress of a separate exemption for "any civic
league or organization," in addition to an exemption for "chambers of
commerce" and similar commercial nonprofit organizations, therefore
significantly broadened the range of nonprofits exempted from the
new federal income tax.2 2 While the addition of "operated exclusively
for the promotion of social welfare" is a limiting factor on the "any
civic league or organization" exemption, there does not appear to have
been a commonly used or accepted legal definition of "social welfare"
at the time. The only relevant legal authority appears to be a New
Jersey state court decision concluding that the term was broader than
18. See supra notes 3 and 10.
19. See 50 CONG. REC. 1306 (daily ed. May 7, 1913) (statement of Rep. Cordell
Hull); Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organiza-
tions from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 303 (1976) (citing id.).
20. See, e.g., Webster Wheelock, Recent Municipal Progress in St. Paul, 3 MUN.
AiF. 491, 499-500 (1899) (describing the newly created Civic League in St. Paul,
Minnesota); Franklin H. Giddings, Sociological Notes, 14 ANNAL S AM. ACAD. POL. &
Soc. Sci. 148, 154 (1899) (describing the creation of the Massachusetts Civic
League); History, WOMAN'S Civic LEAGUE OF PASADENA, http://wclpasadena.org/?
page id=36 (last visited Feb. 6, 2019) (describing founding in 1911); see also Philip
T. Hackney, A Response to Professor Leff's Tax Planning "Olive Branch" for Mari-
juana Dealers, 99 IOWA L. REv. BULl. 25, 28 n.15 (2013) (discussing "civic leagues"
as they existed in the early 1900s).
21. See, e.g., Ex parte Harrison, 212 Mo. 88 (1908) (involving the Kansas City
Civic League "formed for the purpose of investigating the character, fitness or qualifi-
cations of candidates or nominees for public office").
22. See supra note 18.
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"charitable" for purposes of determining whether a trust created to
further social welfare failed as a charitable trust for indefiniteness. 23
While far from definitive, this history indicates that the language
now found in § 501(c)(4) was broad enough to encompass politically
active organizations and a relatively wide range of "civic" organiza-
tions. As the Chamber highlighted, the elimination of the "for profit"
requirement for corporations to be subject to the federal income tax
created a perhaps unintended risk of imposing that tax on a broad
range of existing nonprofit organizations, and Congress may have re-
sponded by enacting the broad and vague language that has now sur-
vived for more than 100 years. Thus, to the extent this exemption is
too broad, a concern I will return to later, it arguably is the statutory
language and not subsequent executive branch interpretations of that
language that ultimately is at fault. The next part describes that
breadth.
II.
THE MANY USES OF § 501(c)(4)
For fiscal year 2017, the IRS reported that there were 81,935 or-
ganizations that claimed tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(4).2 4 In ad-
dition, a recent study by Jeremy Koulish, then with the Urban
Institute, provides a broad analysis of the many different types of enti-
ties that claim this status.2 5 Although both the IRS and Koulish num-
bers are not completely reliable (as Ellen Aprill details in her article),
they likely are sufficient for purposes of getting a general sense of the
relative proportion of the numbers and financial resources of various
types of § 501(c)(4) organizations, and so I have relied on them in this
article.2 6 I also reviewed the largest 150 § 501(c)(4) organizations in
terms of revenues and assets, as found in GuideStar, to identify promi-
23. See Livesey v. Jones, 55 35 A. 1064 (1896), affd sub nom. Chadwick v.
Livesey, 41 A. 1115 (1897).
24. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2017 DATA BOOK 57 (2018). This figure is similar
to the 81,589 § 501(c)(4) organizations identified by Koulish based on the IRS Master
Business File (June 2014) and the Urban Institute National Center for Charitable Sta-
tistics' Core File (2012). See KOULISH, supra note 5, at 6. It is also similar to the
80,226 current § 501(c)(4) organizations found in the GuideStar database. See
GUIDESTAR, https://www.guidestar.org (last visited Feb. 6, 2019) (search for subsec-
tion 501(c)(4), with revoked and defunct or merged organizations excluded).
25. KoULiSH, supra note 5.
26. See Ellen Aprill, History and Policy: Mapping Social Welfare Organizations,
21 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 345, 360-63 (2018).
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nent examples of many of the types of entities that Koulish
identified.27
While the media and academics have paid the most attention in
recent years to politically active § 501(c)(4) organizations, such orga-
nizations represent well under ten percent of all § 501(c)(4) entities
despite being a somewhat greater proportion of the larger § 501(c)(4)
entities based on revenues.2 8 The type of entity with the largest num-
ber of § 501(c)(4) organizations is community service clubs, constitut-
ing almost forty percent of § 501(c)(4) organizations and including the
well-known Kiwanis, Lions, and Rotary clubs. 29 In terms of revenues,
the largest concentration is found with the relatively small number of
health maintenance organizations ("HMOs") and other prepaid medi-
cal plans, with the fewer than 500 such groups receiving almost three-
quarters of the revenues for all § 501(c)(4) organizations. 30
The focus of this Article is not on these relatively common and
well known types of § 501(c)(4) entities, as other authors in this issue
are covering them thoroughly. It is worth noting, however, that politi-
cally active § 501 (c)(4) entities and community service clubs appear
to fit within the original understanding of this exemption category,
particularly given the existence in 1913 of both politically active
"civic leagues" and Rotary clubs. 3 1 With respect to prepaid medical
plans, their qualification under § 501(c)(4) was a twentieth-century
development when it became evident that the IRS and courts would
generally not allow them to qualify for exemption as charities under
§ 501(c)(3), as discussed in Ellen Aprill's article. 32
Instead, this Article's focus is on the many more obscure uses of
§ 501 (c)(4), including for organizations that generally benefit a group
or engage in activities that do not allow them to qualify for exemption
under any other available Code provision (including such organiza-
27. See GUIDESTAR, https://www.guidestar.org (last visited Feb. 6, 2019) (search
for subsection 501(c)(4), with revoked and defunct or merged organizations excluded,
sorted by gross receipts or assets).
28. KOULISH, supra note 5, at 24.
29. Id. at 6, 7 (finding 31,811 (39.0%) community service clubs).
30. Id. at 6 (finding that 459 (0.6%) health providers and insurers make up $63
billion (72.5%) in revenue).
31. See JEFFREY A. CHARLES, SERVICE CLUBS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY: ROTARY,
KIWANIS, AND LIONS 9 (1993); supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text (discussing
civic leagues). Kiwanis clubs and Lions clubs began shortly after 1913. CHARIF S,
supra, at 10.
32. See, e.g., IHC Health Plans v. Comm'r, 325 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir. 2003); Geis-
inger Health Plan v. Comm'r, 985 F.2d 1210 (3d Cir. 1993); Aprill, supra note 26, at
380-83. But see Sound Health Ass'n v. Comm'r, 71 T.C. 158, 191 (1978) (finding that
"staff model" HMO qualified for exemption under § 501(c)(3)), acq., 1981-2 C.B. 2.
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tions that are part of a network of related entities that fall within a
variety of exemption categories), organizations that appear to be able
to qualify for exemption under § 501(c)(3) but for some reason-that
is not always apparent-have chosen not to do so, and organizations
that appear to better fit another exemption category (other than
§ 501(c)(3)) but have chosen-again for reasons that are not always
apparent-to claim exemption under § 501(c)(4). The descriptive is-
sues raised by such uses include how widespread they are, how they
developed, and whether they actually qualify for exemption under cur-
rent § 501(c)(4). The third part of this Article will then address
whether any of these uses are unwise in some fashion that argues for
changes either to the interpretation or to the language of § 501(c)(4) to
prevent such organizations from qualifying for exemption under this
(or perhaps any) Code provision.
A. Non-Charitable Community Benefit Organizations
(Exclusively § 501(c)(4) Organizations)
Perhaps the least surprising use of § 501(c)(4) is by organizations
that either benefit a community that is too limited to qualify the organ-
ization for exemption as a charity under § 501(c)(3) but broad enough
to qualify for exemption as a social welfare organization under
§ 501(c)(4), or engage in activities that go beyond those allowed for
§ 501(c)(3) organizations but not beyond those allowed for
§ 501(c)(4) organizations. 33 As Ellen Aprill details in her article, for
not only community service clubs and prepaid medical plans but also
low-income housing organizations, sports and recreation groups, and
homeowners, tenants, neighborhood, and community associations,
§ 501(c)(4) helps the IRS to safeguard the limits of § 501(c)(3) by
providing such organizations with a tax-exempt alternative if they are
unable to satisfy the requirements of § 501(c)(3) (as interpreted by the
IRS and the courts).34 Similarly, Roger Colinvaux, Rosemary Fei, and
Eric Gorovitz detail in their articles how § 501(c)(4) allows more po-
litical and lobbying activities than § 501(c)(3) does and so provides an
exemption for organizations engaged in a level of those activities that
disqualifies them from exemption under § 501(c)(3). 35 Of course,
33. See Aprill, supra note 26, at 368-75.
34. See Aprill, supra note 26, at 375-79.
35. See Roger Colinvaux, Social Welfare and Political Organizations: Ending the
Plague of Inconsistency, 21 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. Po'Y 337, 481 (2018); Rose-
mary E. Fei & Eric K. Gorovitz, Practitioner Perspectives on Using § 501(c)(4) Or-
ganizations for Charitable Lobbying: Realities and An Alternative, 21 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 337, 535 (2018).
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§ 501(c)(4) status comes with certain downsides as compared to
§ 501 (c)(3) status in exchange for these more relaxed requirements for
exemption, including the downside of donors not being able to deduct
their gifts as charitable contributions.
36
Setting aside organizations that may better fit into an exemption
category other than § 501(c)(3) and § 501(c)(4), which are discussed
in the third section of this Part II, approximately fifty-eight percent of
existing § 501(c)(4) organizations are in this group of non-charitable
community benefit organizations, according to the Koulish report. 37 In
addition, probably a significant portion of the approximately twenty-
eight percent of § 501(c)(4) entities that Koulish characterizes as
"Other" organizations also fall within this group. 38 There are four spe-
cific types of such organizations that are worth considering here: (1)
organizations that perform activities that make § 501(c)(4) their only
available exemption category but do so as part of a network of related
organizations that fall within a variety of exemption categories; (2)
animal-related organizations; (3) gaming organizations; and (4) orga-
nizations that are relatively uncommon but collectively may represent
a significant part of the § 501(c)(4) universe.
1. Networks of Organizations
As Roger Colinvaux, Rosemary Fei, and Eric Gorovitz detail
elsewhere in this issue, the most well-known use of § 501(c)(4) orga-
nizations as part of a network of tax-exempt organizations is to house
lobbying and political activities that either are not compatible with the
exempt status of other organizations within the network or would be
subject to undesirable requirements (for.example, the public disclosure
of most donors requirement for § 527 political organizations) if con-
ducted through another type of tax-exempt entity. 39 Indeed, this use of
§ 501(c)(4) is widespread enough to have led the IRS to develop inter-
36. See I.R.C. § 170(c) (2012) (listing entities eligible to receive tax deductible
charitable contributions, which do not include social welfare organizations).
37. See KoULISH, supra note 5, at 6 (finding 31,811 (39.0%) community service
clubs, 459 (0.6%) health providers and insurers, 5,695 (7.0%) homeowner, tenant,
neighborhood, and community associations, 978 (1.2%) housing communities and de-
velopments, and 8,265 sports and recreation groups (10.1%)).
38. See KoULISH, supra note 5, at 6, 16 (listing the types of organizations classified
as "Other").
39. See Colinvaux, supra note 35, at 486-91; Fei & Gorovitz, supra note 35, at 560
[Part 3]; see also B. HOLLY SCHADLER, THE CONNECTION: STRATEGIES FOR CREATING
AND OPERATING 501(c)(3)s, 501(c)(4)s AND POLITICAL ORGAIZATIONs 3 (4th ed.
2018), https://bolderadvocacy.orglresourcelthe-connection-strategies-for-creating-
and-operating-50lc3s-50lc4s-and-political-organizations; Miriam Galston, Cam-
paign Speech and Contextual Analysis, 6 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 100, 119 (2007).
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nal training materials discussing the permissible roles and relation-
ships of organizations involved in such networks. 40 These networks
can be quite extensive; for example, the national NAACP and a couple
of its affiliates are § 501(c)(3) organizations, but its many local bodies
are § 501(c)(4) organizations. 4 1
The creation of such networks of tax-exempt organizations, in-
cluding one or more § 501(c)(4) organizations, is not limited to the
political context, however. For example, and as discussed further in
the next section, the § 501(c)(4) American Kennel Club has affiliated
§ 501 (c)(3) organizations that each engage in a narrower set of activi-
ties than the Club itself, permitting them to qualify for § 501(c)(3)
status and the additional benefits it provides (including, probably most
importantly, deductibility of contributions for donors). 42 Similarly, the
§ 501 (c)(4) AARP has four related § 501(c)(3) organizations that en-
gage in activities such as helping persons over fifty years old who are
at social and economic risk, providing free or low cost legal assistance
and education to the elderly in D.C., and engaging adults over fifty
years old as mentors to school children, as well as a § 501(c)(4) affili-
ate that holds certain group health insurance policies.4 3 The parent or-
ganizations for the three major community service club networks
(Kiwanis, Lions, Rotary) all have one or more related § 501(c)(3)
organizations. 44
The existence of one or more § 501(c)(4) organizations within
such networks therefore permits the allocation of activities to the type
of tax-exempt organization best suited for each activity. It also per-
40. See Ward L. Thomas & Judith E. Kindell, Affiliations Among Political, Lobby-
ing and Educational Organizations, in EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS: CONTINUING PRO-
FESSIONAL TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000, at 255 (1999),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicsOO.pdf.
41. See NAACP, 2015 Form 990, Sch. R, Pt. II (2016) (listing two related
§ 501(c)(3) organizations); Mark Hrywna, NAACP Picks New CEO, Plans to Create
(c)(4) Organization, NONPROFIT TIMES (Oct. 23, 2017), http://www.thenonprofittimes
.com/news-articles/naacp-picks-new-ceo-plans-to-create-c4-organization/.
42. See infra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
43. See AARP, 2016 Form 990, Sch. R, Pt. 11 (2017) (listing these affiliates and
listing entities that are disregarded as separate entities for federal tax purposes and
related taxable entities); GRANTTHORNTON, AARP CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATE-
MENTS TOGETHER wiTH REPORT OF INDEPENDENT CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS,
DECEMBER 31, 2016 AND 2015, at 7-8, https://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/about-
aarp/about_us/2017/2016-financial-statements-AARP.pdf.
44. See Kiwanis International Inc., 2015 Form 990, Sch. R, Pt. 11 (2017) (listing
two related § 501(c)(3) organizations, one for youth education and another for fun-
draising, as well as a related § 501(c)(4) youth education affiliate); The International
Association of Lions Clubs, 2015 Form 990, Sch. R, Pt. 11 (2017) (listing a related
§ 501(c)(3) "humanitarian foundation"); Rotary International, 2015 Form 990, Sch. R,
Pt. II (2017) (listing a related § 501(c)(3) organization).
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mits, to the extent compatible with each organization's exemption cat-
egory, the sharing of resources, such as facilities and staff (thereby
taking advantage of economies of scale), the provision of financial or
other support between organizations as needed (including in the form
of grants and loans), and certain joint activities, such as fundraising,
website operations, and mailing lists. 4 5 For example, the AARP re-
ports numerous financial transactions between its related organiza-
tions, including grants, the sharing of in-kind services and rent, and
the sharing of the costs of certain employees. 4 6 Of course, maintaining
multiple organizations and ensuring appropriate financial and legal
relationships between them has its own costs and therefore such net-
works are likely primarily used by relatively well-resourced organiza-
tions, for which the benefits provided by such a network outweigh the
administrative costs. 47
2. Animal-Related Organizations
The § 501(c)(4) American Kennel Club ("AKC") is "a purebred
dog registry dedicated to promoting the sport of purebred dogs, re-
sponsible dog breeding, canine health and well-being, and the rights of
all dog owners" with over $60 million in revenue for 2015 (including
revenue received by its 623 member clubs). 48 The breadth of that mis-
sion is in contrast to the more limited mission of the § 501(c)(3) AKC
Canine Health Foundation "to fund, advance, and communicate canine
health research,' 4 9 and AKC's two related § 501(c)(3) affiliates, the
AKC Companion Animal Recovery and the AKC Humane Fund Inc.
50
While not completely clear, the dividing line between § 501(c)(3)
animal-related nonprofits and their § 501(c)(4) counterparts appears to
be based on the language of the former with respect to animals ("pre-
vention of cruelty to ... animals") and the limitation of "educational"
45. See SCHADLER, supra note 39, at 39-54 (detailing permissible resource sharing,
financial transactions, and joint activities between § 501(c)(3) organizations and re-
lated § 501(c)(4) organizations).
46. See AARP, 2016 Form 990, Sch. R, Pt. V (2017).
47. See SClADLER, supra note 39, at t (creating new entities entails costs and ad-
ministrative burdens that may not make doing so the best strategy for every nonprofit
organization).
48. American Kennel Club, Inc., 2015 Form 990, at 1, Sch. D & Sch. 0 (2016).
49. American Kennel Club Canine Health Foundation, 2015 Form 990, at 1 (2016).
50. See supra note 48 at Sch. R, Pt. II (also listing a related § 527 political organi-
zation, the American Kennel Club PAC); American Kennel Club Companion Recov-
ery Corporation 2015 Form 990, at 1 (2016) ("American Kennel Club Companion
Animal Recovery's ... mission is to reunite lost pets with their owners."); The AKC
Humane Fund Inc. 2015 Form 990, at 1 (2016) ("the AKC Humane Fund's mission is
to unite a broad spectrum of animal ...lovers in promoting the joy and value of
responsible pet ownership through education, outreach & grant-making.").
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purposes under § 501(c)(3) to human beings. 51 For example, the
United States Tax Court upheld the denial of exemption under
§ 501(c)(3) to an organization involving dog training based on its con-
clusion that "educational," as used in § 501(c)(3), is limited to educat-
ing human beings, not (other) animals, and its rejection of the
argument that such training is as much or more about educating the
dog owners as it is about educating the dogs. 52
The AKC is far from alone. A GuideStar search reveals there are
at least nine hundred animal-related § 501(c)(4) organizations, includ-
ing not only dog-, cat-, and horse-focused organizations but also safari
clubs and advocacy groups such as the Humane Society Legislative
Fund.5 3 While there is no court or other precedential ruling specifi-
cally addressing the qualification of such organizations for § 501(c)(4)
status, the IRS held in a Technical Advice Memorandum that an or-
ganization established to increase interest in a specific type of animal
commonly owned as pets, to improve the breeds of that animal, and to
hold an annual show for that animal qualified for exemption under
§ 501(c)(4), 54 even though in the same year the IRS also ruled against
§ 501(c)(4) status for an organization with the primary activity of a
dog show. 55 The fatal flaw with the latter organization, however, may
have been that the manner in which it operated its dog show resulted
in it too closely resembling a for-profit activity.
51. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).
52. Ann Arbor Dog Training Club v. Comm'r, 74 T.C. 207, 211-12 (1980); see also
Rev. Rul. 71-421, 1971-2 C.B. 229 (same conclusion).
53. GUIDESTAR, https://www.guidestar.org/Home.aspx (last visited Feb. 2, 2019)
(finding 937 results in a search for NTEE category D (animal related) and subsection
501(c)(4), with revoked and defunct or merged organizations excluded) (Mar. 2,
2018). This figure may be low both because there are not NTEE categories assigned
to all § 501(c)(4) organizations and because some animal-related § 501(c)(4) organi-
zations may be classified under a different NTEE category; for example, the West-
minster Kennel Club is classified under NTEE category N (recreation, sports, leisure,
athletics) instead. At the same time, this search captures some organizations that do
seem to fit in this set of entities; for example, for some reason its results included the
(apparently inactive) Beardsley Fireman's Relief Association. Finally, GuideStar lists
about half of these organizations as having no current gross receipts or assets.
54. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 98-05-001 (Oct. 7, 1997).
55. I.R.S. NSAR 0243R, 1997 WL 33810412 (finding organization does not qualify
for exemption under § 501(c)(4) because it its primary activity is "conducting dog
shows"). The only other arguably relevant IRS ruling is Rev. Rul. 67-293, 1967-2
C.B. 185, but in that ruling the organization was focused on preventing cruelty to
animals, a purpose that would have qualified it for § 501(c)(3) status except that it
attempted to influence legislation as a substantial part of its activities and so instead
qualified under § 501(c)(4).
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3. Gaming Organizations
A possibly unique state statute has led to the creation of two large
gaming organizations in Iowa with ties to local governments and
§ 501(c)(4) status. 56 Iowa law provides that "[a] qualified sponsoring
organization licensed to operate gambling games . .. shall distribute
the [net] receipts of all gambling games .. as winnings to players or
participants or shall distribute the receipts for educational, civic, pub-
lic, charitable, patriotic, or religious uses." 57 These organizations have
therefore claimed § 501(c)(4) status, apparently based on this provi-
sion, along with their role in "providing a source of recreation for the
community, and providing a generally positive economic impact.
58
The IRS did, however, recently question the § 501(c)(4) status of
at least the largest of these two organizations. In 2016, the Prairie
Meadows Race Track and Casino had to fight off an IRS-proposed
revocation of its tax-exempt status. 59 According to press reports, the
state law requirement relating to distributions appears to have been
critical to the favorable result for the organization. 60 While the other
such entity, the Dubuque Racing Association, does not appear to have
faced a similar challenge, it likely would have if the IRS had success-
fully revoked Prairie Meadows' tax-exempt status.
4. Other, Relatively Uncommon, Organizations
Finally, there is a hodgepodge of other relatively uncommon non-
profit entities that have found a home under § 501(c)(4) and that likely
would not qualify under any other exemption category. These non-
profit entities include local associations of employees, which Congress
specifically placed under § 501(c)(4) in 1924,61 inaugural committees,
such as the 58th Presidential Inaugural Committee formed to support
the inaugural activities of President Trump and Vice President
56. See Jason Clayworth, Prairie Meadows Can Keep Its Tax-Exempt Status, IRS
Says, DES MOINES REGISTER (Dec. 21, 2016, 7:07 PM), https://www.desmoines
register.com/story/news/investigations/20 16/12/2 1 /prairie-meadows-can-keep-its-tax-
exempt-status-irs-says/95718368/ (identifying these organizations as "the only casinos
in the nation organized under 501(c)(4)").
57. IOWA CODE ANN. § 99F.6(f)(a)(2) (West 2018).
58. Prairie Meadows Race Track and Casino Inc., 2015 Form 990, at 2 (2016); see
also Dubuque Racing Association, Ltd., 2015 Form 990, at 2 (2016) (describing the
organization's mission as "operation of a casino gaming facility with profits distrib-
uted to the City of Dubuque and local nonprofit organizations to lessen the burden of
government and promote social welfare").
59. Clayworth, supra note 56.
60. Id.
61. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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Pence,62 and foreign organizations, such as the Switzerland-based FH
Association (associated with the § 501(c)(3) Food for the Hungry and
the § 501(c)(3) Food for the Hungry Foundation). 63 The rarity and
variety of these entities makes it hard to make any generalizations
regarding them, other than to observe that they further illustrate
§ 501(c)(4)'s catchall nature.
B. Possible Charities
A perhaps more surprising, or at least less well-known, use of
§ 501(c)(4) is as a basis for exemption by organizations that almost
certainly could also qualify for exemption under § 501(c)(3). It is
often not clear why such organizations have chosen exemption under
§ 501(c)(4) as opposed to under the generally more beneficial
§ 501(c)(3), although as detailed in this Section, there are indications
of the likely motivations in some instances.
It appears the most common types of organizations in this group
are § 501(c)(4) entities that engage in activities generally associated
with government agencies and that often, although not always, have
close ties to local governments. As detailed in the first three sub-sec-
tions below, this category includes organizations involved in eco-
nomic, housing, or other development activities, public safety-related
entities, and municipal financing vehicles. While not always clear, at
least two reasons suggest why these types of groups might not choose
§ 501(c)(3) status. One is that on closer examination, the organization
cannot in fact qualify for exemption under § 501(c)(3) because it is
not sufficiently lessening the burdens of government and does not oth-
erwise fit within that section. The other is that the organization could
qualify for exemption under § 501 (c)(3) but found § 501(c)(4) to be
the more attractive option. For example, § 501(c)(4) might be more
attractive because, unlike § 501(c)(3), it does not usually require the
filing of an exemption application (and even if an application is filed
under § 501 (c)(4) that application may receive less scrutiny from the
62. See 58th Presidential Inaugural Committee 2016 Form 990, at 1 (2017); see
also I.R.S. Gen. Counsel Mem. 39,867 (Dec. 18, 1991), 1991 WL 538822 (conclud-
ing that an inaugural committee for a state governor did not qualify for exemption
under § 501(c)(3)).
63. See, e.g., FH Association, 2015 Form 990, at 1 & Sch. R, Pt. 11 (2016); CAPIN-
CROUSE, FOOD FOR THE HUNGRY CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS WITH
INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' REPORT, SEPTEMBER 30, 2016, at 7, https://www.fh.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/03/FH_2016 FS.pdf. These foreign organizations include also
grantmaking foreign organizations discussed in David Miller's article. See David S.
Miller, Social Welfare Organizations as Grantmakers, 21 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL'y 413, 422-27 (2018).
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IRS than a § 501(c)(3) application does) and because the organization
did not need the benefits of § 501(c)(3) status, such as deductibility of
contributions. 64 Other possible motivations are a desire to avoid the
political and lobbying activity limits or the private inurement prohibi-
tion imposed by § 501(c)(3), although the latter now also applies to
§ 501(c)(4) organizations. 65 Publicly available information on these
organizations, however, does not generally indicate significant politi-
cal or lobbying activity or possible private inurement.
It should be noted that such government-related entities might
also be thought to be eligible for exemption from federal income tax
as an integral part of a state or political subdivision, though this would
not be the case if the organization was not affiliated closely enough.
66
And while organizations that qualify as an integral part of a state or
local government are not eligible for exemption under any paragraph
of § 501(c) because they are not considered a separate entity from that
government, 67 such qualification is often uncertain, so an organization
might choose to claim § 501(c)(4) status as insurance in case the IRS
concluded it did not qualify as an integral part of a government.
68
Similarly, a government-related organization might not qualify for ex-
emption under Code § 115, relating to income of states and municipal-
ities, either because its income is not derived from a public utility or
the exercise of an essential governmental function or because its in-
come does not accrue to a state or political subdivision thereof.69 Such
64. The two exceptions to the voluntary nature of filings by organizations claiming
exemption under § 501 (c)(4) are for credit counseling organizations, which are re-
quired to file an exemption application if they are claiming either § 501(c)(3) or
§ 501(c)(4) status, and for § 501(c)(4) organizations formed after December 17, 2015,
which are required to file a notice with the IRS (but not an exemption application).
See I.R.C. §§ 501(q)(3), 506 (2012).
65. See Colinvaux, supra note 35, at 509 (political activity limit); Fei & Gorovitz,
supra note 35, at 539-41 (lobbying limit); supra note 2 and accompanying text (addi-
tion of private inurement prohibition to I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2015), § 1311(b)(1), 110
Stat. 1452, 1477-78 (1996).
66. See generally Ellen Aprill, The Integral, the Essential, and the Instrumental:
Federal Income Tax Treatment of Governmental Affiliates, 23 J. CORP. L. 803, 810
(1998); Richard A. McCray, Sr. & Marvin Friedlander, Organizations Closely Affili-
ated with State or Indian Tribal Governments Reference Guide, in EXEMPT ORGANI-
ZATIONS: CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM
FOR FISCAl YEAR 2004 (2003), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopichO4.pdf. The
closeness of affiliation required to be considered an integral part is not completely
certain, but the IRS generally requires significant control of the organization by the
relevant government and, more recently, a significant financial commitment on the
part of the government to the organization. April], supra, at 813.
67. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(a)(3) (2016); McCray & Friedlander, supra note
66, at 9.
68. See Aprill, supra note 66, at 810-14.
69. See I.R.C. § 115 (2012); see Aprill, supra note 66, at 814-19.
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an organization could qualify for exemption under § 115, but ob-
taining a favorable § 501(c)(4) determination letter may be easier and
less costly than obtaining the private letter ruling necessary to confirm
§ 115 status.70
In addition to government-related organizations, there are a num-
ber of other § 501(c)(4) organizations that appear to qualify as chari-
ties under § 501(c)(3) but that have not chosen that classification,
including some relatively large organizations financially. The reasons
for this choice are often not evident, although for some of these orga-
nizations one likely motivation is avoidance of the relatively restric-
tive rules that apply to private foundations. The last portion of this
section discusses this sub-group and makes some educated guesses as
to why they have made this choice.
1. Economic, Housing, and Other Development
The largest of the economic, housing, and other development
§ 501(c)(4) organizations appears to be the Los Angeles LOMOD
Corporation ("LOMOD"), which in 2015 had annual revenues and ex-
penses of over $400 million relating to its mission to "support housing
needs for low income families. '7 1 According to its website, LOMOD
manages Section 8 housing projects in Southern California, with over
47,000 units of affordable housing.72 The Housing Authority of the
City of Los Angeles, a public housing authority and related
§ 501(c)(3) organization (according to LOMOD's Form 990), founded
the organization in 1973. 7 3 Another prominent housing development
example is Phipps Houses, which began through a state legislative ac-
tion in 1905 and currently is "the oldest and largest not-for-profit de-
veloper, owner, and manager of affordable housing in New York
70. See McCray & Friedlander, supra note 66, at 3 (noting that a private letter
ruling may be requested regarding whether income is excluded from federal tax under
I.R.C. § 115). While the IRS will not charge a § 115 organization to issue a "govern-
mental information letter" confirming its exemption and ability to receive deductible
contributions (under I.R.C. § 170(c)(1)), it may still be costly to prepare the request
for such a letter. See Governmental Information Letter, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
https://www.irs.gov/govemment-entities/federal-state-local-governments/government
al-information-letter (last updated Feb. 13, 2018).
71. See Los Angeles LOMOD Corporation, 2015 Form 990, at 2 (2016).
72. About L.A. LOMOD, L.A. LOMOD, http://www.lomod.org/AboutLOMOD/re
sponsibilities.aspx (last visited Feb. 6, 2019). Section 8 refers to the Housing Choice
Voucher Program that provides assistance to very low-income families. See Housing
Choice Voucher Program (Section 8), BENEFITS.GOV, https://www.benefits.gov/bene
fits/benefit-details/710 (last visited Feb. 6, 2019).
73. See About L.A. LOMOD, supra note 72; Los Angeles LOMOD Corporation,
2015 Form 990, Sch. R, Pt. 2 (2016).
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City."' 74 This organization may not be able to qualify under
§ 501(c)(3), however, because it builds housing for moderate-income
families as well as low-income families, which may also explain why
it has a § 501(c)(3) affiliate (Phipps Neighborhoods, Inc.) to provide
educational and social services to residents of its housing. 75 A
GuideStar search for § 501(c)(4) entities involved in housing-related
activities for low or moderate income individuals indicates there are at
least several hundred such organizations.
7 6
Not all such organizations focus solely on housing. For example,
the Maryland Economic Development Corporation describes itself as
"an instrumentality of the State of Maryland created by the General
Assembly to serve as a statewide economic development engine.
77
Similarly, JobsOhio is "a private non-profit corporation designed to
drive job creation and new capital investment in Ohio through busi-
ness attraction, retention, and expansion efforts."'7 8 For accounting
purposes, it is considered a "component unit" of the State of Ohio,
which means that the State of Ohio is financially accountable for it.
7 9
More globally, a GuideStar search reveals there are almost five hun-
dred § 501(c)(4) organizations engaged in community improvement or
capacity building with the term "economic" in their name or mission
scattered across almost all 50 states. 80
74. Press Center, PHIPPS HOUSES, http://www.phippsny.org/about/press-center/
(last visited Feb. 6, 2019).
75. Housing, PHIPPS HousEs, http://www.phippsny.org/properties/housing (last
visited Feb. 6, 2019); Corporate Structure, PHIPPS HOUSES, http://www.phippsny.org/
about/corporate-structure/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2019).
76. GUIDESTAR, https://www.guidestar.org (last visited Feb. 6, 2019) (finding 432
results in a search for NTEE category L (housing, shelter), "income," and subsection
501(c)(4), with revoked and defunct or merged organizations excluded). In contrast to
a number of the other searches, GuideStar reported no current gross receipts or assets
for very few (less than three percent) of these organizations.
77. About, MD. ECON. DE. CORP., http://medco-corp.com/at-a-glance/about/ (last
visited Feb. 6, 2019).
78. About Us Jobs Ohio, JonsOHmo, http://jobs-ohio.com/about-jobsohio/ (last vis-
ited Feb. 6, 2019).
79. See DELOirrE & TOUCHE LLP, JOBSOHIo FINANCIAL STATEMENTS JUNE 30,
2017 AND 2016, at 1 (2017), http://jobs-ohio.com/site/assets/files/2012/jobsohio-fy
17_financial statementswith independent auditor report.pdf; GOVERNMENTAL Ac-
COUNTING STANDARDS BOARD (GASB), STATEMENT No. 14: THIE FINANCIAL REPORT-
ING ENTITY, para. 20 (1991), https://www.gasb.org/jsp/GASB/DocumentC/Docu
mentPage?cid=1176160030209&acceptedDisclaimer=true (defining a "component
unit").
80. GUIDESTAR, https://www.guidestar.org (last visited Feb. 6, 2019) (finding 487
results in a search for "economic," NTEE category S (community improvement, ca-
pacity building), and subsection 501(c)(4), with revoked and defunct or merged orga-
nizations excluded). GuideStar lists approximately fifteen percent of these
organizations as having no current gross receipts or assets.
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In general, it appears that these organizations-whether focused
on housing or economic development more generally-are neither
sufficiently tied to state or local governments to qualify as integral
parts of such governments nor perform an essential government func-
tion that would qualify their income for exemption under § 115. It is
less clear, however, why such organizations have not sought exemp-
tion under § 501(c)(3) given that their close ties to such governments
and activities arguably could qualify them for that status on the basis
of lessening the burdens of government. 81 In addition, some of these
organizations, particularly the housing-related ones, might be able to
qualify because they are relieving the poor and distressed or
underprivileged. 82
In general, for an organization to qualify for § 501(c)(3) status on
the first basis, a government must demonstrate that it considers the
organization's activities to be its burden and the organization's activi-
ties must actually lessen the burdens of government. 83 The mere fact
that the government sometimes undertakes the organization's activi-
ties or that a government official expresses approval of the organiza-
tion is insufficient. 84 As the examples already cited illustrate,
however, it appears that these development organizations often have
the necessary connections to government-including often being
founded by governments and those governments being financial ac-
countable for the organizations-to meet the lessening the burdens of
government standard. Again, some of these organizations might in-
stead or in addition qualify based on the economic needs of the popu-
lations or communities they serve. In fact, similar GuideStar searches
under § 501(c)(3) reveal that thousands of such organizations have
qualified for exemption under that section, although it is unclear on
what specific grounds.8 5 That said, since these organizations that qual-
ify for exemption under § 501(c)(4) tend to rely on government grants
and fees (such as rents) as opposed to private donations, and they ap-
81. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (as amended in 2017) (including "lessen-
ing of the burdens of Government" within the term "charitable" for purposes of
§ 501(c)(3)).
82. See id. (including "relief of the poor and distress or of the underprivileged"
within the term "charitable" for purposes of § 501(c)(3)).
83. See Rev. Rul. 85-1, 1985-1 C.B. 177; Rev. Rul. 85-2, 1985-1 C.B. 178.
84. See Rev. Rul. 85-2, supra note 83.
85. GIJ1DESTAR, https://www.guidestar.org (last visited Feb. 2, 2019) (finding 9,531
results in a search for NTEE category L (housing, shelter), "income," and subsection
501(c)(3) public charities, with revoked and defunct or merged organizations ex-
cluded, and 4,187 results found in a search for "economic," NTEE category S (com-
munity improvement, capacity building), and subsection 501.(c)(3) public charities,
with revoked and defunct or merged organizations excluded).
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pear to be able to access tax-exempt bond financing through their af-
filiated governments, it may be that they do not need the advantages of
§ 501(c)(3) status and so instead have opted for the easier claim to
§ 501(c)(4) status.
2. Public Safety
There are over 5,000 § 501(c)(4) organizations identified as vol-
unteer public safety organizations. 86 Based on a GuideStar search,
over 4,000 of these groups are involved in fire protection and appear
to be either volunteer fire departments or firemen relief associations
(the latter of which provide benefits such as cash stipends and pension
funds to paid or volunteer firefighters).8 7 Their qualification for
§ 501(c)(4) status appears to stem from many states' intentional ef-
forts to statutorily create a close enough relationship with local gov-
ernments such that these organizations lessen the burdens of
government. 88 These efforts were critical at least for relief associa-
tions because the IRS and courts had taken the position that relief
associations for first responders generally did not qualify for such sta-
tus, since their primary purpose was to provide financial security for
their members, only incidentally promoting social welfare. 89
As of 2015, there were over 800,000 volunteer firefighters in
over 25,000 fire departments (almost 20,000 of which were all volun-
teer), generally serving smaller communities. 90 Many appear to qual-
ify for exemption under § 501(c)(3), as a GuideStar search indicates
there are over 9,000 organizations involved in fire prevention, protec-
86. KOULISH, supra note 5, at 6.
87. GIDESTAR, https://www.guidestar.org (last visited Feb. 2, 2019) (finding 4,033
results in a search for NTEE Code M24 (fire prevention/protection/control) and sub-
section 501(c)(4), with revoked and defunct or merged organizations excluded).
GuideStar lists approximately thirty percent of these organizations as having no cur-
rent gross receipts or assets.
88. See Rev. Rul. 87-126, 1987-2 C.B. 150; Debra Cowen & Terry Berkovsky,
Volunteer Firefighters' Relief Organizations: A Second Look, in EXEMPT ORGANIZA-
TIONS: CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000, at 105, 106-07 (1999), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/
eotopicgO0.pdf; Sadie Copeland & Debra Cowen, Volunteer Firefighters' Relief Or-
ganizations, in EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS: CONTINUING PROFFSSIONAL EDUCATION
TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 1996 (1995), https://www.irs
.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicn96.pdf.
89. See Police Benevolent Ass'n v. United States, 661 F. Supp. 765, 768-69 (E.D.
Va.), aff'd per curiam, 836 F.2d 547 (4th Cir. 1987); Rev. Rul. 81-58, 1981-1 C.B.
331.
90. See HYLTON J.G. HAYES & GARY P. STEIN, U.S. FIRE DEPARTMENT PROILE
2015, at v (2017), http://www.nfpa.org/news-and-research/fire-statistics-and-reports/
fire-statistics/the-fire-service/administration/us-fire-department-profile.
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tion, and control that have successfully claimed that status. 9 1 There are
a variety of reasons why such groups might not qualify or may have
chosen not to qualify for that status but are still eligible for exemption
under § 501(c)(4), such as having social activities as a significant al-
though not primary purpose or wanting to avoid the burden of having
to file the required application for § 501(c)(3) status.92 As for the re-
maining volunteer fire departments, it seems likely that they qualify as
integral parts of governments and so do not need to claim (and indeed
cannot claim) exemption under § 501.93
As for relief associations, it is likely that they are declining in
number over time because of the current availability of other exemp-
tion provisions for employee benefit plans under §§ 401(a) and
457(b). Possibly because of inertia, a number remain exempt under
§ 501 (c)(4), however, with a GuideStar search for "pension" revealing
close to two hundred such organizations. 94 A majority of them fall
under the NTEE Code for fire prevention, protection, and control, in-
dicating that they are associated with fire departments (both volunteer
and paid). 95 The largest appears to be the Bloomington Fire Depart-
ment Relief Association in Minnesota, with net assets of $155 million
as of the end of 2016.96
3. Municipal Financing
Another type of "public sector" § 501(c)(4) organization com-
prises entities formed and controlled by municipalities to support the
financing of government purchases. Such organizations appear to be
91. See GUIDESTAR, https://www.guidestar.org (last visited Feb. 2, 2019) (finding
9,335 results in a search for NTEE Code M24 (fire prevention/protection/control) and
subsection 501(c)(3) public charities, with revoked and defunct or merged organiza-
tions excluded).
92. See Rev. Rul. 66-179, 1966-1 C.B. 139 (finding that a garden club that engages
in social functions as a substantial but not primary activity qualifies for exemption
under § 501(c)(4) but not under § 501(c)(3)).
93. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
94. GULDESTAR, https://www.guidestar.org (last visited Feb. 2, 2019) (finding 185
results in a search for "pension" and subsection 501(c)(4), with revoked and defunct
or merged organizations excluded). GuideStar lists approximately ten percent of these
organizations as having no current gross receipts or assets.
95. GUIDESTAR, https://www.guidestar.org (last visited Feb. 2, 2019) (finding 111
results in a search for NTEE Code M24 (fire prevention/protection/control), "pen-
sion," and subsection 501(c)(4), with revoked and defunct or merged organizations
excluded). GuideStar lists approximately five percent of these organizations as having
no current gross receipts or assets.
96. Bloomington Fire Department Relief Association, 2016 Form 990, at 1 (2017).
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concentrated in California for reasons that are unclear.97 While in
terms of numbers they appear to be relatively few-a couple hundred
at most and likely significantly fewer because it was difficult to isolate
such organizations from other types of § 501(c)(4) organizations-
they are significant in terms of revenues and assets. 9 8 The largest mu-
nicipal financing entity is the Municipal Improvement Corporation of
Los Angeles, which, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2016, reported
over $63 million in revenue and over $2 billion in assets and liabili-
ties, 99 and the organizations in Riverside, San Bernardino, Sacra-
mento, and San Diego reported revenues in the tens of millions
annually and assets and liabilities in the hundreds of millions. 10°
These organizations are closely enough related to governmental
entities that they appear to be considered "component units" of those
entities for accounting purposes because they operate exclusively for
the benefit of the related governmental entity. 10 1 The board members
of these entities also appear to generally be appointees of the related
governmental entity.' 0 2 Given these common characteristics, it ap-
pears these entities could qualify for exemption under § 501(c)(3) be-
cause they are lessening the burdens of government.1 0 3 It is not clear
97. Based on a GuideStar search for "finance" and subsection 501(c)(4) and then
reviewing the results for organizations of this type, the two such organizations of
comparable size to the largest California such entities are both in Arizona, although
there are several others scattered around the country. See City of Scottsdale Municipal
Property Corporation, 2015 Form 990, at 1 (2017); City of Glendale Municipal Prop-
erty Corp., 2015 Form 990, at 1 (2017).
98. See GUIDI STAR, https://www.guidestar.org (last visited Feb. 2, 2019) (finding
336 results in a search for "finance" and subsection 501(c)(4), with revoked and de-
funct or merged organizations excluded, but this includes a significant number of
other types of § 501(c)(4) organizations).
99. See Municipal Improvement Corporation of Los Angeles, 2015 Form 990, at 1
(2017).
100. See County of Riverside Asset Leasing Corporation, 2015 Form 990, at 1
(2017); Inland Empire Public Facilities Corporation, 2015 Form 990, at 1 (2017) (lo-
cated in San Bernardino County); Sacramento County Public Facilities Financing Cor-
poration, 2015 Form 990, at 1 (2016); San Diego County Capital Asset Leasing
Corporation, 2015 Form 990, at 1 (2016).
101. E.g., MGO, MUNICIPAl IMPROVEMENT CORPORATION OF Los ANGELES, FINAN-
CIAL STATEMENTS: JUNE 30, 2016 AND 2015, at 1, 11 (2017), http://clkrep.lacity.org/
onlinedocs/2017/17-0184_misc_2-16-17.pdf; see GASB, supra note 79. These enti-
ties also tend to list their relevant local governments as related tax-exempt organiza-
tions on their Forms 990. E.g., Municipal Improvement Corporation of Los Angeles,
2015 Form 990, Sch. R, Pt. 2 (2017) (listing City of Los Angeles); County of River-
side Asset Leasing Corporation, 2015 Form 990, Sch. R, Pt. 2 (2017) (listing County
of Riverside).
102. E.g., Submittal from Kevin Jeffries, Supervisor, to Bd. of Supervisors, Cty. of
Riverside, State of Calif. (June 13, 2017), http://rivcocob.org/proceeds/2017/p2l7
06_13_files/02.02001.pdf.
103. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
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why they have chosen § 501(c)(4) status instead, although as men-
tioned previously it may be that they did not need any of the advan-
tages of § 501(c)(3) status and choosing § 501(c)(4) status allowed
them either to avoid filing an application with the IRS or to receive
easier and quicker approval of their application if they chose to file
one. The apparent concentration of such entities in California may also
indicate a state-specific reason, but if so, that reason is not apparent.
4. Other Charities on Their Face
There are a number of other § 501(c)(4) organizations, including
several that are relatively large financially, that appear to be able to
qualify for exemption under § 501(c)(3) but have chosen not to do so.
For example, the $216 million Beaumont Foundation of America grew
out of a settlement with Toshiba relating to alleged defects with its
notebook computers and originally funded efforts to close the digital
divide, although today it focuses on helping the poor and disen-
franchised more generally.1°4 Because of its lawsuit origins, Toshiba
presumably did not need to (and likely could not) claim a charitable
contribution deduction for its initial funding, although it probably was
instead able to deduct that amount as a business expense, so there was.
no need for § 501(c)(3) status and the private foundation restrictions
that would come with it. Similar reasons may explain why the $130
million, Commonwealth Edison-funded Illinois Clean Energy Com-
munity Foundation also is classified under § 501(c)(4), in that the Illi-
nois Legislature conditioned approval of the sale by Commonwealth
Edison of seven power plants on Commonwealth Edison creating and
funding the foundation. 10 5 At least several such entities grew out of
the conversions of Blue Cross entities from nonprofit to for-profit sta-
tus, with § 501(c)(4) status perhaps being attractive to avoid the ex-
cess business holdings rule applicable to private foundations. 10 6
104. See Kelly Holleran, Toshiba 10 Years later: Formation of the Beaumont Foun-
dation of America, SE TEX. REC. (Nov. 2, 2009), https://setexasrecord.com/stories/
510611807-toshiba- 10-years-later-formation-of-the-beaumont-foundation-of-ameica;
Beaumont Foundation of America, 2016 Form 990, at 1 (2017); BEAUMONT FOUND.
OF AM., http://www.bmtfoundation.com/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2019).
105. See Ill. Clean Energy Cmty. Found. v. Filan, 392 F.3d 934, 935 (7th Cir. 2004);
Illinois Clean Energy Community Foundation, 2016 Form 990, at 1 (2017); About the
Foundation, ILL. CLEAN ENERGY Cwrmy. FOUND., https://www.illinoiscleanenergy.org/
about-foundation (last visited Feb. 6, 2019).
106. See James Fishman, Checkpoints on the Conversion Highway: Some Trouble
Spots in the Conversion of Nonprofit Health Care Organizations to For-Profit Status,
23 J. CORP. L. 701, 715 (1988) ("After the conversion three organizations may exist:
in addition to the for-profit corporation and the foundation, a section 501(c)(4) organi-
zation may be created to receive and hold the stock for later sale and to remit the
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More generally, and as David Miller details in his article, the
likely motivation for domestic and international grant-making entities
with a single funding source to choose § 501(c)(4) status even when
they might also qualify under § 501(c)(3) is to avoid the private foun-
dation restrictions while still obtaining exemption for their usually sig-
nificant (United States) investment income. 10 7 At the same time,
presumably these organizations do not need the benefits of § 501(c)(3)
status, including the ability of donors to deduct their gifts as charitable
contributions. This motivation may explain why, in addition to the
examples already provided, organizations as varied as the Conference
on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany, l0 8 the Mangrove Foun-
dation (associated with Atlantic Philanthropies), 10 9 and the Rose Hills
Foundation (created by the § 501(c)(13) Rose Hills Memorial Park)110
are all exempt under § 501(c)(4) despite their activities' clearly chari-
table nature.
At least one other large § 501(c)(4) organization that likely could
qualify under § 501(c)(3) is less easy to explain. Karing is a vehicle
founded by Brown University to hold property and help develop an
educational and research facility in a particular neighborhood in Provi-
dence, Rhode Island."' It may be that specific but not easily discover-
able characteristics of this organization either make it ineligible for
§ 501(c)(3) status or make such status unnecessary. There probably
proceeds to the foundation."); L. Pitesa, Regulatory Agency Action: Department of
Corporations, CAL. REG. L. REP., Winter 1995, at 105, 107 (attributing the choice to
classify the California Healthcare Foundation as a § 501(c)(4) organization to the ad-
vantage of the Foundation being able to continue to own stock in the resulting for-
profit entity); California Healthcare Foundation, 2015 Form 990 (2016); The Missouri
Foundation for Health, 2015 Form 990 (2016); About the Foundation, Mo. FOUND.
FOR HEALTH, https://mffh.org/the-foundation/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2019).
107. Miller, supra note 63, at 434-35; see, e.g., FINRA Investor Education Founda-
tion, 2015 Form 990, at 1 (2016) (reporting $4.6 million in investment income out of
$55.3 million in total annual revenue); About Us, FINRA INv. EDUC. FOUND., https://
www.finrafoundation.org/about-us (last visited Feb. 6, 2019) (noting that the FINRA
Investor Education Foundation was established by the § 501(c)(6) Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority).
108. See Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany, 2015 Form 990,
at 1 (2015) (reporting $2.1 million in investment income out of $680.5 million in total
annual revenue); About Us, CLAIMS CONF.: THE CONF. ON JEWISH MATERIAL CLAIMS
AGAINST GERMANY, http://www.claimscon.org/about/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2019).
109. See The Mangrove Foundation, 2015 Form 990, at 1 (2016) (reporting $49.6
million in total annual revenue, all of which was investment income).
110. See The Rose Hills Foundation, 2016 Form 990, at 1, 9 (2017) (reporting $10.7
million in total annual revenue, all of which was investment income); About the Foun-
dation, THE ROSE HILLS FOUND., http://www.rosehillsfoundation.org/TheFoundation
.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2019).
111. See Karing, 2016 Form 990 (2017); KPMG, BROWN UNIVERSITY FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS JUNE 30, 2017 AND 2016, at 6 (2016).
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are at least a handful of smaller organizations in similar situations, but
short of reviewing information relating to every existing § 501(c)(4)
individually, it is difficult, if not impossible, to identify such
organizations.
C. Possible Other Exemption Categories
The last group of § 501(c)(4) organizations to consider are those
that appear to better fit exemption categories other than § 501(c)(4)
and § 501(c)(3). These include electric and water cooperatives given
§ 501(c)(12), veterans' organizations given § 501(c)(19), and home-
owners associations given § 528.112
1. Electric and Water Cooperatives
A number of relatively large § 501(c)(4) organizations are associ-
ated with the provision of electricity and water. The largest is the Na-
tional Rural Utilities Cooperative Finance Corporation, which
provides financing to rural electric cooperatives and others to the tune
of over a billion dollars in annual revenue and is organized as a coop-
erative. 113 Most of these entities, however, are cooperatives directly
providing various communities with access to electricity and water,
where the members of the organization serve as both its owners and its
customers. A GuideStar search reveals slightly over a hundred
§ 501(c)(4) organizations classified as public utilities, with almost all
appearing to be cooperatives involved in the delivery of electricity or
water to various communities.1 1 4 They also appear to have been suffi-
ciently numerous (and politically influential) to have received a lim-
ited exemption to the private inurement prohibition added to
§ 501(c)(4) in 1996.115 While this exemption applies to all § 501(c)(4)
112. See I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(12), 501(c)(19), 528 (2012).
113. See National Rural Utilities Cooperative Finance Corporation, 2015 Form 990,
at 1 (2017); Overview, NAT'L RURAL UTILS. Coop. FIN. CORP., https://www.nrucfc.co
op/content/cfc/aboutcfc/overview.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2019). For this organiza-
tion's description of its history, see generally PATRICIA LLOYD WILLIAMS, THE CFC
STORY: How AMERICA'S RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES INTRODUCED WALL STREET
TO MAIN STREET (1995).
114. GItDESTAR, https://www.guidestar.org (last visited Feb. 2, 2019) (finding 111
results in a search for NTEE category W80 (public utilities), and subsection 501(c)(4),
with revoked and defunct or merged organizations excluded). GuideStar lists approxi-
mately forty percent of these organizations as having no current gross receipts or
assets.
115. See Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, § 1311(b)(2), 110 Stat.
1452, 1478 (1996) ("In the case of an organization operating on a cooperative basis
which, before the date of the enactment of this Act, was determined by the Secretary
of the Treasury or his delegate, to be described in section 501(c)(4) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 and exempt from tax under section 501(a) of such Code, the
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organizations operating on a cooperative basis, outside of the utilities
context, most organizations that function as cooperatives are not eligi-
ble for § 501(c)(4) status. 116
These organizations are often formed under statutes specifically
designed to support their creation. With respect to electricity genera-
tion and distribution, the relevant federal statute is the Rural Electrifi-
cation Act of 1936, which created the Rural Electrification
Administration ("REA") and authorized its Administrator's loans for
rural electrification. 117 States then facilitated the creation of such enti-
ties through various state statutes, sometimes modeled on the Rural
Electric Cooperative Act drafted by the REA.1 18 Rural water coopera-
tives appear to have a similar history of government support through
statutes to facilitate their creation and funding. 119
Given their cooperative, membership structures, it is likely that
these organizations would not qualify for exemption under § 501(c)(3)
for similar reasons as prepaid medical plans. 120 In fact, most such co-
operatives appear instead to be tax-exempt under § 501 (c)(12), which
provides specifically for "mutual or cooperative electric" companies
and requires that such companies receive eighty-five percent of their
income from their members to qualify for exemption. 121 According to
the latest IRS Data Book there are over 5,000 organizations recog-
nized as exempt under that paragraph, and a GuideStar search indi-
allocation or return of net margins or capital to the members of such organization in
accordance with its incorporating statute and bylaws shall not be treated for purposes
of such Code as the inurement of the net earnings of such organization to the benefit
of any private shareholder or individual. The preceding sentence shall apply only if
such statute and bylaws are substantially as such statute and bylaws were in existence
on the date of the enactment of this Act.").
116. See Contracting Plumbers Coop. Restoration Corp. v. United States, 488 F.2d
684, 685 (2d Cir. 1973); Consumer-Farmer Milk Coop. v. Comm'r, 186 F.2d 68, 70
(2d Cir. 1950); Mutual Aid Ass'n of the Church of the Brethren v. United States, 578
F. Supp. 1451, 1457 (D. Kan. 1983), afT d, 759 F.2d 792 (10th Cir. 1985). But see
Rancho Santa Fe Ass'n v. United States, 589 F. Supp. 54, 55-57 (C.D. Cal. 1984)
(finding that homeowners' association organized as a cooperative qualified for
§ 501(c)(4) status).
117. See Rural Electrification Act of 1936, 7 U.S.C. § 902 (2012).
118. See HARRY SLATTERY, RURAL AMERICA LIGHTS Up 45-47 (1940).
119. See Research on the Economic Impact of Cooperatives, UNIV OF WIS. CTR. FOR
Coops., http://reic.uwcc.wisc.edu/water/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2019).
120. See Aprill, supra note 26, at 380-83.
121. I.R.C. § 501(c)(12)(A), (C); see generally Michael Seto & Charyl Chasin, Gen-
eral Survey of I.R.C. 501(c)(12) Cooperatives and Examination of Current Issues, in
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS: CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL IN-
STRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 2002, at 175 (2001), https://www.irs.gov/pub/
irs-tege/eotopice02.pdf; W.G. Beecher, Note, Is It Time to Revoke the Tax-Exempt
Status of Rural Electric Cooperatives?, 5 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY, CLIMATE, &
ENV'T 221. 229 (2013).
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cates that over 3,000 of them are involved in managing water systems
and almost 900 of them are involved in managing electrical sys-
tems. 122 The very limited legislative history of § 501(c)(12), first en-
acted in 1916 and amended to lower the membership income
requirement from 100% to 85% in 1924, indicates, but does not af-
firmatively state, that it was meant to be the exclusive exemption pro-
vision for such cooperatives. 123 Indeed, prior to 1916, but after the
initial enactment of what is now § 501(c)(4), the Treasury Department
held that cooperatives were generally subject to the federal income
tax. 
12 4
It is unclear why a relatively small number of such coopera-
tives-slightly over a hundred, as noted previously-have instead
chosen to be exempt under § 501(c)(4). One possibility is that they are
not able to satisfy the eighty-five percent membership income require-
ment of § 501(c)(12).125 The basis for the exemption of such entities
under § 501(c)(4) can be found in a 1946 federal appellate court deci-
sion, which held that "[p]roviding electricity at low cost to citizens of
a community, in some instances where electricity was not available
before, is promoting social welfare." 126 The IRS subsequently ruled
that an organization formed for the purpose of establishing and main-
taining a system for the storage and distribution of water to increase
underground water levels in a community also qualified for exemption
under § 501(c)(4) because it was operating to benefit the entire com-
munity. 127 Despite these rulings, there is no acknowledgement in the
four IRS internal training documents that have focused on coopera-
122. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 24, at 57; GUIDESTAR, https:/lwww
.guidestar.org (last visited Feb. 2, 2019) (finding 3,249 results in a search for "water"
and subsection 501 (c)(12), with revoked and defunct or merged organizations ex-
cluded; finding 869 results in a search for "electric" and subsection 501(c)(12), with
revoked and defunct or merged organizations excluded).
123. See S. REP. No. 68-398, at 29 (1924); 1 WALTER E. BARTON & CAROLL W.
BROWNING, BARTON'S TAX LAWS CORRELATED: THE FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATE, AND
GIFT LAWS FROM THE REVENUE ACT OF 1913 TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF
1954 AS AMENDED 186-87 (2d ed. 1954) (showing first appearance of the predecessor
to current § 501(c)(12) in the Revenue Act of 1916); Clayton S. Reynolds, Tax-Ex-
empt Electric Cooperatives: A Discussion of Issues Relating to the 85% Member In-
come Requirement, 55 TAX LAW. 585, 585 & n.3, 588 (2002); Seto & Chasin, supra
note 121, at 176.
124. HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, A TREATISE ON FEDERAL TAXES INCLUDING THOSE
IMPOSED BY THE WAR TAX ACT OF CONGRESS OF 1917, THE INCOME TAX LAW AS
AMENDED, AND OTHER UNITED STATES INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS Now IN FORCE
§ 136, at 162 (1918).
125. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
126. Unites States v. Pickwick Elec. Membership Corp., 158 F.2d 272, 277 (6th Cir.
1946).
127. Rev. Rul. 66-148, 1966-1 C.B. 143.
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tives or in the few scholarly articles regarding the tax treatment of
such cooperatives that a number of such cooperatives have claimed
exemption under § 501(c)(4). 12 8
2. Veterans' Organizations
According to the Koulish report, there are over 6,000 military
and veterans' organizations that have claimed tax-exempt status under
§ 501(c)(4). 1 2 9 This is somewhat surprising given that § 501(c)(19)'s
exemption provision more specifically targets such organizations and
that according to the latest IRS Data Book, there are almost 30,000
organizations recognized as exempt under that paragraph. 130 But this
choice may be driven both by § 501 (c)(19)'s relatively strict member-
ship requirements1 3 and by historical inertia, in that most veterans'
groups claimed exemption under § 501(c)(4) before the 1972 enact-
ment of § 501(c)(19) and some may simply never have bothered to
switch exemption categories.
13 2
Unlike the situation with electric and water cooperatives, there
does not appear to be any indication that Congress viewed
128. See Seto & Chasin, supra note 121; Donna Moore & Robert Harper, Internet
Service Providers: Exempt Issues Under IRC 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(12), in EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS: CONTINUING PROFESSIONAI EDUCATION TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION
PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 1999, at 55 (1998), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/
eotopicc99.pdf; Patrick K. Orzel & Edward K. Karcher, Current Issues Affecting Cer-
tain Cooperatives and Like Organizations Described Under IRS 501(c)(12), in Ex-
EMPT ORGANIZATIONS: CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICA.
INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 1994 (1993), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
tege/eotopicd94.pdf; Current Technical Issues: Electric Cooperatives and Coopera-
tive Telephone Companies Described in IRC 501(c)(12), in EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS:
CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FIs-
CAL YEAR 1980 (1979), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopici8O.pdf; Reynolds,
supra note 123; Beecher, supra note 121, at 228.
129. KOULISH, supra note 5, at 6 (finding 6,365 (7.8%) military and veterans' orga-
nizations); see also Reilly et al., supra note 11, at 1-22 (describing how a veterans'
organization may qualify under § 501(c)(4)).
130. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 24, at 57.
131. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(19)(B) (2012) (requiring the organization's membership to
be composed of "at least 75 percent past or present members of the Armed Forces of
the United States and substantially all of the other members of which [to be] individu-
als who are cadets or are spouses, widows, widowers, ancestors, or lineal descendants
of past or present members of the Armed Forces of the United States or of cadets" to
qualify for exemption).
132. See Weingarden v. Comm'r, 86 T.C. 669, 676-77 (1986), rev'd on other
grounds, 825 F.3d 1027 (6th Cir. 1987); Veterans' Organizations, in EXEMPT ORGA-
NIZATIONS: CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAl INSTRUCTION PRO-
GRAM FOR FiscAL YEAR 1986, at 1 (1985), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicp
86.pdf [hereinafter Veterans' Organizations].
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§ 501(c)(19) as an exclusive category for veterans' organizations. 33
Rather, it appears that most veterans' organizations have voluntarily
chosen that category because of the disadvantages of other available
categories, particularly with respect to application of the unrelated
business income tax. 134 The IRS has also generally been quite flexible
when it comes to veterans' organizations, long holding that such orga-
nizations may qualify for exemption under a variety of provisions and
not just § 501(c)(4) and § 501(c)(19).1 35
3. Homeowners' Associations
There is no IRS data publicly available regarding the number of
organizations claiming exemption under § 528, as compared to the be-
tween 6,000 and 7,000 such entities that currently claim exemption
under § 501(c)(4). 136 As detailed in Ellen Aprill's article, homeown-
ers' associations and similar organizations formed by the owners or
renters of residential property in a given geographic location some-.
times have difficulty qualifying for exemption under even
§ 501(c)(4)'s relatively loose requirements. 137 This difficulty led Con-
gress to enact § 528 for such entities-a provision that grants exemp-
tion for their membership dues, fees, and assessments but not for
investment or other income (in contrast to § 501(c)(4)), subject to the
association meeting certain membership income and expenditure re-
quirements. 138 As this history indicates, Congress did not intend § 528
to be an exclusive provision for such organizations (unless they could
not meet § 501(c)(4)'s requirements), as the IRS has
acknowledged. 139
133. See Weingarden, 86 T.C. at 680-81; S. REP. No. 92-1082, at 2-3, 4-5 (1972) as
reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3141, 3142-43, 3144-45.
134. See I.R.C. § 512(a)(4) (excluding certain premium payments relating to mem-
bers or their dependents from unrelated business taxable income for § 501(c)(19) or-
ganizations); Veterans' Organizations, supra note 132, at 1-3.
135. See Rev. Rul. 66-150, 1966-1 C.B. 147 (finding that a veterans' organization's
subsidiary that owned meeting space used by the parent veterans' organization quali-
fied for exemption under § 501(c)(7)); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX GUIDE: VET-
ERANS' ORGANIZATIONS 21-24 (2013) (describing how veterans' organizations may
qualify under §§ 501(c)(8) and 501(c)(10)).
136. See KouiISH, supra note 5, at 6 (finding 5,695 (7.0%) homeowner, tenant,
neighborhood, and community associations, and 978 (1.2%) housing communities and
developments).
137. See Aprill, supra note 26, at 388-89.
138. See I.R.C. § 528; Aprill, supra note 26, at 389-90.
139. See Reilly et al., supra note 5, at I-1, 1-12, 1-20 to 1-21, https://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-tege/eotopici03.pdf.
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III.
RETHINKING THE USES OF § 501(c)(4) ORGANIZATIONS
The enormous variety of organizations that currently claim ex-
emption from federal income tax under § 501(c)(4) naturally raises the
concern mentioned previously that the "catchall" nature of this section
may, at least in some situations, be inappropriate or undesirable as a
policy matter. To determine whether and in what specific contexts this
concern is valid requires understanding how § 501(c)(4) status differs
from other possible tax classifications, the theory or theories generally
justifying exemption under this section, and careful consideration of
the many specific uses of this section previously identified.
A. Comparing and Contrasting § 501(c)(4) Status
If an organization qualifies under § 501(c)(4), it enjoys a broad
exemption from federal tax on its net income with only two excep-
tions. 140 One exception is for unrelated business taxable income
("UBTI"), i.e., income that is from a regularly carried on trade or busi-
ness that is not substantially related to the purpose or purposes that
qualify the organization for exemption under § 501(c)(4), and that
does not fall under any of the exceptions to UBTI. 14 1 UBTI also in-
cludes certain debt-financed income.' 4 2 UBTI is usually subject to not
only federal income tax but also state income tax. 14 3 The other excep-
tion is for the lesser of net investment income or amounts spent on
influencing or attempting to influence the selection, nomination, elec-
tion, or appointment of any individual to any public office or office in
a political organization. 144
The breadth of the exemption for § 501(c)(4) organizations con-
trasts not only with the general taxability of net income for for-profit
entities but also with the more limited exemption for certain other cat-
egories of tax-exempt organizations.1 45 For example, § 501(c)(7) so-
cial clubs, § 501(c)(9) voluntary employees' beneficiary associations,
140. See I.R.C. § 501(a), (c)(4).
141. See id. §§ 511-513.
142. See id. § 514.
143. See Marianne Evans, Allison Hedges & Kathleen Zack, State Taxation of Ex-
empt Organizations' Unrelated Business Income, TAX ADVISER (June 1, 2013), https:/
/www.thetaxadviser.com/issues/2013/jun/clinic-story-03.html; Bazil Facchina, Evan
A. Showell, Jan E. Stone, Privileges & Exemptions Enjoyed by Nonprofit Organiza-
tions, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 85, 99 (1993).
144. See I.R.C. § 527(e), (f).
145. See Daniel Halperin, Income Taxation of Mutual Nonprofits, 59 TAX L. REV.
133, 148 (2006) (referring to these three tax treatments as full exemption, full taxa-
tion, and partial exemption).
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§ 501(c)(17) supplemental unemployment compensation benefit
trusts, and § 528 homeowners' associations are subject to tax on their
income from non-members and on their investment income, essen-
tially leaving only member income exempt from tax. 146 In addition,
§ 527 political organizations are subject to tax not only on their in-
vestment income but also on any other income not dedicated to their
political purposes. 147
At the same time, § 501(c)(4) organizations enjoy some but not
all of the federal tax benefits enjoyed by certain other categories of
tax-exempt organizations. Most notably, their donors are not eligible
for a charitable contribution deduction for federal income tax and fed-
eral estate tax purposes, unlike donors to § 501(c)(3) charities and cer-
tain veterans' organizations. 148 Thanks to a recent statutory
clarification by Congress that resolved some previous uncertainty,
however, their donors are now clearly able to avoid federal gift tax on
their contributions, similar to several other categories of tax-exempt
organizations, including § 501(c)(3) organizations.1 49 In common with
most tax-exempt organizations but not § 528 political organizations,
donors to § 501(c)(4) entities of appreciated property do not realize
the gain built into donated property and so usually do not pay tax on
such gains. 150 Finally, and in contrast primarily to § 501(c)(3) organi-
zations, § 501(c)(4) organizations generally do not enjoy exemption
from state taxes other than income taxes and also do not enjoy most of
the non-tax benefits enjoyed by § 501(c)(3) entities. 151
B. The Theory
The basis for exemption for nonprofit organizations generally, in-
cluding § 501(c)(4) organizations, starts with the insight that the act of
146. See I.R.C. § 512(a)(3); David S. Miller, Reforming the Taxation of Exempt Or-
ganizations and Their Patrons, 67 TAX LAW. 451, 455 (2014).
147. See I.R.C. § 527(c)(1)(A).
148. See id. §§ 170(c), 2055(a).
149. See I.R.C. §§ 2501(a)(6), 2522(a); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub.
L. No. 114-113, Div. Q, § 408, 129 Stat. 2242, 3120 (amending I.R.C. § 2501(a));
Barbara Rhomberg, Constitutional Issues Cloud the Gift Taxation of Section 501(c)(4)
Contributions, 15 TAX'N EXEMPTS 164, 164 (2004); Barbara Rhomberg, The Law
Remains Unsettled on Gift Taxation of Section 501(c)(4) Contributions, 15 TAX'N
EXEMPTS 62, 62 (2003).
150. See I.R.C. § 84; Miller, supra note 146, at 499.
151. Memorandum from Erika Lunder, Legislative Attorney, Am. Law Div., to Joint
Comm. on Taxation (Feb. 16, 2005), in STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH
CONG., HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND PRESENT LAW OF THE FEDERAL TAX EXEMP-
TION FOR CHARITIES AND OTHER TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 195 (Comm. Print
2005); Facchina et al., supra note 143.
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aggregating funds for the purpose of pursuing a collective, non-busi-
ness (i.e., not for-profit) activity should not be subject to tax as long as
any net income is either refunded to the persons supporting the activ-
ity (i.e., dues-paying members) or retained for future use that furthers
the nonprofit's purposes. 152 This insight assumes that there is no sub-
sidy provided by an income tax exemption under these circumstances,
given that the persons supporting the activity presumably have already
paid whatever income taxes were owed on the funds they used to sup-
port the nonprofit organization.
There is a flaw with this assumption, however. It ignores the time
value of money and the resulting subsidy that occurs if the exemption
extends to investment income or to funds used for capital expendi-
tures.' 53 For this reason, Daniel Halperin has proposed that social wel-
fare organizations providing more than incidental benefits to their
members (such that the members benefit significantly from any sub-
sidy, as opposed to the public more generally) not enjoy exemption for
their investment income.1 54 Ellen Aprill agrees with this insight, al-
though as she details in her article, she is concerned about the practical
ability to determine when benefits to members become more than
incidental. 155
152. See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 19, at 348-49; Halperin, supra note 145, at
134. But see Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations
from Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 95-96 (1981) (conceding the force
of this insight but arguing that exemption for such organizations creates a bias in favor
of nonprofits over proprietary businesses with respect to activities covered by the
exemption); Miller, supra note 146, at 468-69 (questioning the extent to which this
insight is correct if members pay disproportionate fees or are entitled to disproportion-
ate benefits).
153. See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 19, at 354-55, 357; Halperin, supra note 145,
at 145, 155-56; Miller, supra note 146, at 471-76.
154. Daniel Halperin, The Tax Exemption Under I.R.C. § 501(c)(4), 21 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. PoL'Y 519, 534 (2018). Halperin finds that at least with respect to what
he labels "consumer mutual organizations," the time value of money issue raised by
capital expenditures is of lesser concern. Halperin, supra note 145, at 147-48.
155. See Aprill, supra note 26, at 397-401. Halperin also argues that for mutual
benefit nonprofits that are viewed by their customers as equivalent to commercial
counterparts no exemption may be justifiable, which reasoning might apply to prepaid
medical plans and possible electrical and water cooperatives. See Halperin, supra note
145, at 149; see also Miller, supra note 146, at 462-65 (making a similar argument
with respect to § 501(c)(8) fraternal benefit societies that provide insurance). Prepaid
medical plans are discussed at length in Aprill's article so I will not address this
concern with respect to them. See Aprill, supra note 26, at 380-83. As for electrical
and water cooperatives, they have their own exemption category that should be the
exclusive basis for exemption for reasons discussed below, and it is beyond the scope
of this article to consider whether that other exemption category is itself problematic.
See supra notes 121-125 and accompanying text.
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There is also another complication, as David Miller details. 156
The benefits flowing from tax-exempt status are not always limited to
exemption from income tax. Most notably for § 501(c)(4) organiza-
tions, this includes the ability of donors to avoid including gain from
donated appreciated property in their taxable income, which he argues
provides a significant subsidy and violates principles of horizontal and
vertical equity. 157 If, however, investment income, including realized
and recognized gain, is not exempt from tax for the recipient
§ 501(c)(4) organizations, that would render this complication less
significant. How less significant would depend both on how the tax
rate applicable to the recipient § 501(c)(4) organization for such gain
compared to the tax rate usually applicable to donors on such gain and
on how much time usually passes between receipt of such donations
and realization and recognition of that gain by the recipient
§ 501(c)(4) organization. For example, if a recipient § 501(c)(4) entity
paid the current corporate income tax rate of twenty-one percent on
such gain, which would be the same rate faced by corporate donors on
such gain and similar to the tax rates usually faced by individual do-
nors on such gain, and if recipient § 501(c)(4) entities usually sell
donated assets shortly after receiving them so any gain is subject to
tax shortly after the donation, then this complication would not be
very significant. 158
I find these points as developed by Aprill, Halperin, and Miller to
be persuasive and so generally agree with their proposed fine-tuning
of the tax rules for § 501(c)(4) organizations. That said, their insights
do not undermine the basic rationale for exemption for § 501(c)(4)
organizations. The question that remains, therefore, is whether the cur-
rent broad range of organizations covered by § 501(c)(4) as detailed
above is defensible, assuming appropriate fine tuning of the scope of
the § 501(c)(4) exemption.
C. Problems on the Borders?
Section 501(c)(4) does not exist in isolation. It is part of a con-
stellation of exemption provisions that Congress and the Treasury De-
partment have developed over time to cover a broad array of
156. See Miller, supra note 146. David Miller also raises concerns relating to politi-
cal activities, but since such issues are thoroughly covered in other articles in this
issue, I will not address them here. See Colinvaux, supra note 35, at 509; Fei &
Gorovitz, supra note 35, at 552.
157. Miller, supra note 146, at 498-500.
158. See I.R.C. § 1(h) (2012) (individual net capital gain tax rates); id. § 11 (corpo-
rate tax rate); id. § 1411(c) (additional individual tax on net investment income).
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organizations and provide a varied set of tax benefits, as summarized
briefly above. Ellen Aprill recognizes this fact in her article when she
discusses a number of "border skirmishes" that highlight the trade-offs
between different exemption categories for organizations that may be
able to qualify under more than one such category. 159 Those trade-offs
are worthy of further discussion in the context of the broader range of
organizations I have considered in this Article. For purposes of this
analysis, I consider first those organizations for which § 501(c)(4) is
the only available exemption category, then ones for which it appears
§ 501(c)(3) may also be available, and finally ones for which a cate-
gory other than § 501(c)(3) may be available.
1. Section 501(c)(4) or Bust
Organizations in the first set, for which the only options are taxa-
bility or exemption under § 501(c)(4), generally include prepaid medi-
cal plans (including IMO's), most animal-related groups, possibly
some of the public sector entities, and likely also most of the residual
organizations, such as inaugural committees. 160 Formed as nonprofits
under state law but lacking an available exemption category outside of
§ 501(c)(4), the question is whether the rationale for exemption that
supports § 501(c)(4) exemption generally also supports inclusion of
these groups in that category.
In considering this question, it is important to remember that
these organizations are subject not only to whatever limitations state
law may impose on them and to the general positive requirements of
§ 501(c)(4) but also to the private inurement prohibition codified in
§ 501(c)(4) and supported by the intermediate sanctions available
under § 4958.161 The effect of these limitations, requirements, and
prohibition is to effectively limit these § 501(c)(4) organizations to the
types of collective activities that benefit a significant community and
fit within the exemption's rationale, while at the same time preserving
the greater benefits that come with § 501(c)(3) status for entities that
more clearly provide significant public benefit. The availability of
§ 501(c)(4) exemption for this varied group of collective activity orga-
159. See Aprill, supra note 26, at 384-93.
160. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (noting that prepaid medical plans
generally are not eligible for § 501(c)(3) exemption); supra notes 51-52 and accompa-
nying text (noting the limited availability of § 501(c)(3) exemption for animal-related
groups); supra note 62 (inaugural committees generally not eligible for § 501(c)(3)
exemption).
161. See I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(4)(B), 4958(e)(1).
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nizations therefore appears generally to be defensible. 62 It also pro-
vides, as Ellen Aprill discusses in more detail, an "escape hatch" for
nonprofit organizations that likely would prefer § 501(c)(3) status but
are willing to accept § 501(c)(4) status instead to avoid a lengthy ad-
ministrative process and possibly a litigation dispute with the IRS,
thereby reducing costs for both the organization and the
government. 163
2. When is a Charity Not a Charity?
Organizations in the second set include (1) probably most of the
"public sector" § 501(c)(4) organizations discussed above, which may
be capable of qualifying for § 501(c)(3) status either because they
lessen the burdens of government or, less commonly, they relieve the
poor and distressed or underprivileged, and also (2) the other "chari-
ties on their face" § 501(c)(4) organizations that appear to meet
§ 501(c)(3)'s requirements other than having actually applied for that
status. Assuming these observations are correct, the key question is
whether by instead choosing to be exempt under § 501(c)(4) these or-
ganizations escape any restrictions or requirements that should apply
to them. With one exception, that does not appear to the case. While
as § 501(c)(4) entities they avoid the requirement to file an application
for recognition of exemption and the stricter limitations on political
activities imposed by § 501(c)(3), this requirement and these limita-
tions are generally justified by the significant subsidy § 501(c)(3) enti-
ties can receive because of the ability of donors to make tax deductible
contributions. Having chosen not to take advantage of that subsidy (or
indeed any of the many other benefits that usually are only available
to § 501(c)(3) organizations), such organizations should also be free
from the requirements and limitations justified by it.164
David Miller details the one exception in his article. 165 It appears
that some organizations in this category would be classified as private
162. With the possible exception of prepaid medical plans that resemble commercial
entities from the perspective of their members. See supra note 155.
163. See Aprill, supra note 26, at 405-08.
164. As already discussed, there are elements of the existing rules for § 501(c)(4)
organizations that may provide a subsidy in a different manner, but that is a systemic
issue for all § 501(c)(4) organizations and not just the ones in this category. See supra
notes 153-157 and accompanying text.
165. See Miller, supra note 146, at 493. There does not appear to be any indication
that the relatively few pension and other employee benefit plans that are exempt under
§ 501(c)(4) have chosen that category in order to avoid restrictions that otherwise
would apply to such plans, especially since they are generally subject to extensive
state statutory requirements and government oversight. See, e.g., REBECCA OTTO, OF-
FICE OF STATE AUDITOR, STATE OF MINN., BLOOMINGTON FIRE DEPARTMENT RELIEF
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foundations if they were under § 501(c)(3) and so subject to the addi-
tional restrictions applied by Congress to such entities if they were
§ 501(c)(3) organizations. 166 The ability of these § 501(c)(4) entities
to escape the private foundation restrictions is problematic because
Congress imposed some of those restrictions out of a concern that pri-
vate foundations often improperly benefit the small group of individu-
als who control them, since such organizations lack public oversight
given that they are not reliant on the public for financial support.
167
More specifically, Congress designed the § 4941 prohibition on self-
dealing and the § 4943 limitation on excess business holdings to pre-
vent the improper use of organizational assets for the private benefit of
the organization's insiders. 168 This same risk exists for a § 501(c)(4)
funded and controlled by a single entity or family and so not reliant on
the broader public for financial support. Allowing what would other-
wise be a private foundation to escape these restrictions only at the
cost of giving up the charitable contribution deduction, which may not
be particularly important for some funders, creates, in my view, the
potential for abuse both with respect to private inurement (which
§ 4941 is designed to prohibit through the imposition of a relatively
strict set of prohibitions on dealings with insiders) and with respect to
maintaining control of a family business while placing it beyond the
reach of the estate tax and possible takeover by non-family members
(which § 4943 is designed to prevent by limiting the combined owner-
ship of any given business by a private foundation and its insiders).
This result suggests that Congress should extend some of the pri-
vate foundation restrictions-particularly §§ 4941 and 4943-to
AsSOCIA1iON 9 (2017), http://bfdra.org/images/2016_Bloomington-Fire-Department
ReliefAssociation.pdf.
166. See I.R.C. § 509 (defining private foundation); id. §§ 4940-4945 (detailing re-
strictions on private foundations). These organizations would be classified as private
foundations if they were under § 501(c)(3) because they rely exclusively or almost
exclusively on investment income from an endowment for their financial support, as
opposed to relying on financial support from donors, members, or purchasers of goods
or services. See id. §§ 170(b)(1)(A)(iv), 509(a)(1), (2) (providing various financial
support tests § 501(c)(3) organizations must satisfy to avoid private foundation sta-
tus); Johnny Rex Buckles, Should the Private Foundation Excise Tax on Failure to
Distribute Income Generally Apply to "Private Foundation Substitutes"? Evaluating
the Taxation of Various Models of Charitable Entities, 44 NEW ENG. L. REv. 493,498
(2010) (describing these tests).
167. See generally Thomas A. Troyer, The 1969 Private Foundation Law: Historical
Perspective on Its Origins and Underpinnings, 27 ExE Mr'r ORG. TAX REv. 52, 64
(2000).
168. See id. at 57, 58. The § 4945 limitations on certain expenditures also may stem
in part from these characteristics and so partial extension of that provision should be
considered as well. See id. at 60-61.
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§ 501(c)(4) organizations that are not able to satisfy any of the
grounds for escaping private foundation classification as a
§ 501(c)(3).169 This recommendation assumes that the dangers ad-
dressed by §§ 4941 and 4943 were significant in practice and are also
likely to occur in the § 501(c)(4) context if the donors involved do not
need the charitable contribution deductions available for § 501(c)(3)
organizations. This assumption seems likely to be correct particularly
given the increasing experimentation by wealthy individuals with non-
traditional vehicles for their philanthropic and civic activities, but it
may take a clear example of such abuse to generate sufficient political
support for such a statutory change.17 0
3. Options or Exclusivity?
Finally, there are several types of organizations for which Con-
gress has created a separate exemption category, including electric and
water cooperatives (which could also fall under § 501(c)(12)), veter-
ans' organizations (which could also fall under § 501(c)(19)), and
homeowners' associations (which could also fall under § 528). As
noted above, for at least the first two types of organizations, most such
organizations choose the separate available exemption category, but a
significant number are still found under § 501(c)(4).
The issue is whether such organizations should be able to choose
between § 501(c)(4) and that other category or whether instead there
are reasons for concluding that the other category is or should be the
exclusive category for such entities. Relying on congressional intent is
one way to resolve this issue, but such intent is not always completely
clear.1 71 To supplement consideration of possibly unclear congres-
sional intent, it is therefore also worth considering whether the other
category imposes fewer or more restrictions than § 501(c)(4) and
whether it provides fewer or more benefits than § 501(c)(4), and then
to consider whether the trade-offs between the two categories are jus-
tifiable. For example, if the other category imposes more restrictions
but also provides more benefits as compared to § 501(c)(4), and the
additional restrictions are related to the additional benefits, then al-
lowing organizations a choice may be appropriate. If, on the other
169. See I.R.C. § 509(a).
170. See generally Dana Brakman Reiser, Sharon C. Lincoln & Ingrid Mittermaier,
Using Non-501(c)(3) Vehicles to Accomplish Philanthropic Objectives, TAXES, Dec.
2017, at 41, 45.
171. For an example of such intent in a different context, see Zeta Beta Tau Frater-
nity v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 421, 435 (1986) (concluding that Congress intended for na-
tional fraternities to be exempt under § 501(c)(7) and not § 501(c)(10)).
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hand, the other category imposes more restrictions but has the same or
fewer benefits than § 501(c)(4), it may be that allowing an organiza-
tion to choose § 501(c)(4) instead of the other category undermines
Congress' purpose in creating the other category.
a. Electric and Water Cooperatives
The tax benefits of categorization under §§ 501(c)(4) and
501(c)(12) are identical, except for the exclusion of § 501(c)(4) orga-
nizations from the application of the federal gift tax. 172 That differ-
ence is probably irrelevant to these cooperatives, as they do not rely
on donations, much less large donations, for financial support. Look-
ing only at benefits, it therefore appears irrelevant which category a
given cooperative chooses.
The restrictions imposed by these two provisions vary signifi-
cantly, however. Section 501(c)(4) now has an explicit prohibition on
private inurement that is absent from § 501 (c)(l 2), while § 501 (c)(12)
strictly requires eighty-five percent of the organization's income to
come from members for qualification under that provision.173 But the
private inurement provision is likely not significant to cooperatives
that had § 501(c)(4) status before its enactment in 1996 because Con-
gress included a limited exception for cooperatives as noted previ-
ously. 17 4 Therefore, it appears that the main effect of such
cooperatives maintaining their § 501(c)(4) status is the ability to es-
cape § 501(c)(12)'s membership income requirement.
As mentioned above, the very limited legislative history with re-
spect to what is now § 501(c)(12) indicates that Congress intended
that provision to be the sole basis for exemption because it was con-
cerned that a cooperative with substantial non-member income too
closely resembled a for-profit business. 17 5 While the application of
§ 501(c)(4)'s private inurement prohibition to new cooperatives may
at least partially address that concern, that prohibition is not the mech-
anism Congress chose to address that concern in this context. Moreo-
ver, the prohibition also does not completely reach older cooperatives
that had previously qualified under § 501 (c)(4) because of the limited
172. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
173. Compare I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)(B) with id. § 501 (c)(]2)(A), (C). Section 501(c)(4)
organizations also have a limit on their amount of political activity in the form of
supporting or opposing candidates for elected office as detailed in the article by Roger
Colinvaux, but there is no indication that such activity is a significant part of the
activities of § 501(c)(4) electric or water cooperatives. See Colinvaux, supra note 35,
at 486-87.
174. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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exception Congress created for them. There is therefore at least an
argument that the § 501(c)(4) cooperatives should be examined with
an eye toward requiring, consistent with the apparent congressional
intent, that they switch to § 501(c)(12) status (and limit their non-
member income as required by that provision if necessary).
The court decision and Revenue Ruling cited earlier supporting
§ 501(c)(4) status for such cooperatives may be a barrier to forcing
such changes through a Revenue Ruling or even regulations. 176 If
there is evidence that a significant number of these § 501(c)(4) coop-
eratives have substantial non-member income, Congress may have to
act to clarify that § 501(c)(12) is the exclusive exemption basis for
such organizations (with appropriate transition provisions for existing
§ 501(c)(4) cooperatives). Before Congress does so, it should also
consider whether there are any reasons to allow one or more existing
§ 501(c)(4) cooperatives to remain exempt, whether under that section
or through some other mechanism, even if they do not satisfy
§ 501(c)(12)'s membership income requirements. For example, the fi-
nancing structure of the National Rural Utilities Cooperative Finance
Corporation may disqualify it for § 501(c)(12) status, but it may serve
an important support role for rural utilities that would be significantly
hindered by a loss of tax-exempt status. 177
b. Veterans' Organizations
Veterans' organizations present a different situation, as compared
to electric and water cooperatives, in two ways. First, qualification for
deductibility of contributions for donors requires meeting significant
membership requirements that are independent of the § 501(c)(4) or
§ 501(c)(19) requirements. 17 A veterans' organization that wants the
subsidy provided by the charitable contribution deduction must meet
this separate membership requirement, while one that cannot meet that
requirement forgoes that significant benefit but without loss of
exemption.
Second, while the scope of the benefits and restrictions imposed
by § 501(c)(4) (which does not have an explicit membership require-
176. See supra notes 126-127 and accompanying text.
177. See National Rural Utilities Cooperative Finance Corporation, 2014 Form 990,
at 2 (2017) (providing additional data for Part III, Line 4a, including its financing
structure).
178. See Rev. Rul. 84-140, 1984-2 C.B. 56 (at least ninety percent of members must
be war veterans, with substantially all of the other members either veterans (but not
war veterans), cadets, or close relatives of war veterans, veterans, or cadets). The
Revenue Ruling requirement also applies with respect to the estate tax deduction
under I.R.C. § 2522(a)(4).
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ment) are the same as found in § 501(c)(19) (which has an explicit
membership requirement) because both provisions prohibit private in-
urement, 179 there is no evidence that Congress intended § 501(c)(19)
to be the sole basis for exemption by veterans' organizations. 180 Con-
sistent with this lack of intended exclusivity, the IRS has long held
that such organizations may qualify for exemption under a variety of
provisions and not just §§ 501(c)(4) and 501(c)(19).181 It therefore ap-
pears that for veterans' organizations, the flexibility provided by hav-
ing § 501(c)(4) as one option for exemption, but not the only one, is
justifiable under the existing statutory scheme. 182
c. Homeowners' Associations
As Ellen Aprill details in her article, Congress has recognized
that homeowners' associations and similar entities face challenges
qualifying for exemption under § 501(c)(3) and even under
§ 501(c)(4) because of the limited communities they tend to serve. 183
To address these challenges, Congress has therefore created effec-
tively a sliding scale: (1) those associations that benefit the largest and
most indefinite communities can qualify under § 501(c)(3) (and re-
ceive the subsidies and other benefits inherent with that status); (2)
those that benefit a smaller or more definite population that makes up
the entirety of a politically defined geographic area can qualify under
§ 501(c)(4) (and receive the broad exemption from income tax de-
scribed previously); and (3) those that benefit an even smaller commu-
nity can only qualify under § 528 (and receive a limited exemption
179. Compare I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2012) with id. § 501(c)(19).
180. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 135.
182. David Miller has argued that the combination of benefits currently enjoyed by
§ 501(c)(19) veterans' organizations, including not only broad exemption from fed-
eral income tax but also no limits on political activity or lobbying and, if separate
membership requirements are satisfied, the ability to receive tax deductible contribu-
tions, is not justified on policy grounds. Miller, supra note 146, at 461, 476-77. While
addressing that argument is beyond the scope of this Article, I would note that there
are policy grounds for favoring veterans and the organizations that benefit them above
and beyond other types of tax-exempt organizations in light of their service to our
country. See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540,
550-51 (1983) (rejecting a constitutional equal protection challenge to the limit on
lobbying by § 501(c)(3) organizations based on the lack of such a limit for
§ 170(c)(3)/§ 501(c)(19) veterans' organizations because it is rational for Congress to
favor veterans' organizations in this manner in light of the burdens borne by veterans
for our country).
183. See Aprill, supra note 26, at 388-89.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Legislation and Public Policy
[Vol. 21:439
§ 501(C)(4)'S "CATCHALL" NATURE
that does not reach non-member or investment income).1 84 While an
organization that is on the border between these classifications may
face some uncertainty, the overall trade-off of breadth of community
served with benefits received is logical as well as clearly intended by
Congress. 185 Therefore, as with veterans' organizations, the availabil-
ity of § 501(c)(4) status for homeowners' associations that could also
qualify for § 528 status is justifiable, while providing a homeowners'
association that could but chooses not to qualify for § 501 (c)(3) status,
and so gives up the benefits of that status in exchange for the reduced
requirements of § 501(c)(4) also appears reasonable. The only issue,
however, is if Congress fine-tunes the scope of the § 501(c)(4) as pro-
posed by Aprill, Halperin, and Miller described above.1 86 Because
homeowners' associations provide a significant benefit to their mem-
bers, the vast majority of them would then lose their exemptions for
non-member and investment income. In that case, the question of
whether § 528 should become the exclusive exemption provision for
homeowners' associations (that do not qualify under § 501(c)(3))
should be examined, especially given the § 528 limits on membership
income and expenditures.
CONCLUSION
Section 501(c)(4)'s "catchall" nature makes it difficult to cata-
logue all of the various types of organizations that have successfully
claimed exemption under this provision. Using IRS statistics, Urban
Institute research, and the GuideStar database, however, it is possible
to begin to get a sense of that variety. This information reveals that
qualification for this status is generally justifiable both under the theo-
retical basis for exemption and the overall structure of the Code's ex-
emption and related provisions, as well as upon consideration of
apparent congressional intent. That said, there are several areas where
qualification for § 501(c)(4) status could potentially undermine that
structure.
The first and perhaps most obvious such situation is the possible
use of § 501(c)(4) by organizations that would be considered private
foundations if they claimed exemption under § 501(c)(3) to escape the
application of the private foundation restrictions designed to prevent
184. See generally Homeowners' Associations Under IRC 501(c)(4), 501(c)(7) and
528, in EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS: CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL
INSTRUCT1ION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 1982 (1981), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
tege/eotopicr82.pdf.
185. See supra notes 138-139 and accompanying text.
186. See supra Section IIIB.
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abuses stemming from the control of the organization by a single en-
tity or family. There does not appear to be any current evidence of
such abuse in the § 501(c)(4) context, but the risk of abuse is likely
increasing with both the growing interest in non-traditional philan-
thropic vehicles and the removal of the gift tax shadow from
§ 501(c)(4) organizations. At a minimum, a close examination of ex-
isting such entities and any newly formed ones is warranted to deter-
mine if those restrictions should be extended to such § 501(c)(4)
organizations.
A second and less obvious situation is the use of § 501(c)(4) by a
relatively small number of electric and water cooperatives even
though it appears that Congress intended § 501(c)(12) to be the sole
basis for exemption for such entities. Again, there does not appear to
be any evidence thaf this use has led to abuses, such as avoidance of
the membership income requirement imposed by § 501(c)(12) or,
more importantly, operation in a manner closely resembling a for-
profit business. But the possibility that such abuses exist because these
§ 501(c)(4) organizations have avoided the restrictions Congress
sought to impose on cooperatives justifies closer examination of the
situation. This is particularly true given that some of these entities are
relatively large financially.
Outside these two relatively narrow areas, there does not appear
to be any pressing need to consider curtailing § 501(c)(4)'s "catchall"
nature. Rather, its availability appears to provide needed flexibility (1)
to organizations that serve the community but in a manner that is too
limited to qualify for § 501(c)(3) status; (2) to government-related and
other entities that serve their communities but do not need the benefits
of § 501(c)(3) status, and thus have no reason to assume the burdens
of that status; and (3) to a variety of other nonprofit organizations that
perhaps could qualify for other exemption categories but nevertheless
fit the rationale for the § 501(c)(4) exemption. While there may be
grounds for reducing the scope of that exemption generally, particu-
larly with respect to investment income, this is a global change that
does not suggest that the availability of § 501(c)(4) should be limited.
Section 501(c)(4)'s "catchall" nature is therefore generally desirable
and logical as part of the Code's overall exemption structure.
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